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Abstract 
Punishment is traditionally justified retributively or consequentially; that is, with respect to the 
desert of the wrongdoer or the positive consequences of the punishment.  State-sanctioned 
punishment (the kind of punishment that is administered by the state to those who break the law), 
I find, cannot be justified in these traditional ways.  In the first two chapters of this thesis I take a 
detailed look at these traditional theories of punishment and point out several strong moral 
objections which provide reason to believe they do not sufficiently justify punishment.  In the 
next chapter, I argue that punishment can only be morally justified as a last resort of keeping 
society safe, as described in the Public Health-Quarantine Model of Punishment (PHQ model).  
That is, punishment can only be justified insofar as it is necessary for ensuring the safety of 
individuals in a society.  Even then, however, I argue in the fourth chapter that the state creates 
an obligation to the wrongdoer when it punishes her for breaking the law.  This obligation, I 
argue, is best fulfilled by providing every reasonable opportunity to assist with the wrongdoer’s 
rehabilitation into society.  
By taking seriously my recommendation of ensuring the health of the wrongdoer, I 
provide an interpretation of the PHQ model which avoids the “mere means” objection to 
punishment.  That is, it ensures that wrongdoers are not merely used as a means of promoting the 
general wellbeing of society, but are treated as autonomous individuals who deserve the respect 
that is required of all people.  Most importantly, it ensures that dangerous wrongdoers who are 
incarcerated for the safety of society are helped as quickly and efficiently as possible, similar to 
the way in which we are obligated to treat those with dangerously infectious diseases who are 
quarantined to ensure they cannot unintentionally harm others.  By ensuring wrongdoers are 
treated this way, the PHQ model of punishment cannot lose sight of the needs of the individual in 
iv 
 
favour of the greater good for society.  In that way, my argument that state-sanctioned 
punishment entails an obligation to the wrongdoers, actually strengthens the PHQ model from 
some common (and often damning) objections to the justification of punishment. 
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Preface 
Punishing individuals when they have done something wrong is relatively commonplace; 
perhaps even expected or to be desired.  We punish children when they hit their siblings, we 
punish a person who drives recklessly in a school zone, and we punish dangerous criminals for 
causing monetary or physical harm to society or citizens.  The reason why we punish is also 
usually very straightforward: the subject of our punishment has done something wrong, broadly 
construed, as something undesirable or unacceptable given social or moral norms.  Our goals for 
what the punishment ought to achieve may differ greatly case by case – we may wish the 
wrongdoer to learn a lesson, or to exact our revenge on someone who has slighted us, or to deter 
others from wronging us in the future, or some other reason entirely – but at the very least, we 
can say that punishment is a common response to those who have done something wrong.   
People begin to disagree, however, on when, exactly, we are justified in administering a 
punishment, or even who “we” is meant to represent.  Indeed, the topic is widely debated, not 
only in philosophy, but in politics, businesses, and households alike.  Questions arise, such as: 
when is it acceptable to punish? How severely are we allowed to punish? Should the outcomes of 
the punishment be taken into consideration? Which outcomes are acceptable and not acceptable? 
Is it okay to punish just because someone deserves it? What does it even mean to deserve a 
punishment? and Who is allowed to punish?  These questions have far-reaching implications for 
the way our society functions as a whole.  Not only are they philosophical questions that relate to 
questions about free will and determinism, agency, and moral theory, but they have dramatic, far 
reaching political and institutional consequences and implications.  It is because many people 
accept a certain set of answers to those questions that we have courts and prisons, and feel 
entitled to incarcerate many thousands of people.  If, for example, we determine that it is only 
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ever morally acceptable to punish an individual who has committed some wrong for the explicit 
purpose of making society safe, and not because he or she truly deserves some harm for her 
immoral actions, then it appears that our current justice system might be totally unjustified in the 
way that it punishes convicted criminals (and, indeed, I believe that it is). 
The answers to these questions determine the kinds of punishment that are meted out, 
since moral justifications will provide strict guidelines for when and how a punishment ought to 
be carried out.  It is important, then, to determine what makes a punishment justified, and then 
what practical applications this has on how we go about punishing wrongdoers.  Of particular 
interest in this discussion – at least to me – is how this affects state-sanctioned punishment, since 
the state is supposed to be an indifferent, unbiased entity for ensuring justice within society.  If 
that is the case, and given the enormous power that it has, then it seems incredibly important that 
the state is absolutely justified when it punishes one of its citizens lest it fail at the high standards 
to which we hold it.  For this reason, the contents of this thesis tend to focus more specifically on 
state-sanctioned punishment rather than the punishment that might be between a parent and child 
or a dog trainer and her disobedient dog. 
I discuss three kinds of justification for punishment in this thesis: forward-looking, 
backward-looking, and mixed justifications (which incorporate elements from both forward- and 
backward-looking justifications).  They might also be referred to as consequentialist/utilitarian or 
retributivist/desert-based; and they refer to the moral imperatives that are being used to justify 
different theories of punishment.  In chapter one, I briefly outline the most common theory of 
punishment for each kind of justification, providing an overview of its unique appeals and 
disadvantages.  These are the forward-looking deterrence theory, the backward-looking 
retributivist/desert theory, and the mixed justification, moral education theory of punishment. 
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The deterrence theory of punishment is purely consequentialist (H.L.A. Hart 1959; Rawls 
1955); that is, it claims that a punishment is only ever justified if it produces desirable 
consequences (where desirable consequences are usually considered to be a safer society with 
fewer crimes committed, or simply fewer criminals overall).  In this way, the ends always justify 
the means, so that if a punishment produces better results than any of the alternatives (i.e., not 
punishing a wrongdoer), then the punishment is justified, and perhaps, morally required.  This is 
a forward-looking justification of punishment because it is only concerned with future 
consequences and denies the value of considerations such as a victim’s retribution or a 
wrongdoer’s deserving to be harmed for her wrongs, at least inasmuch as it could be considered 
separate from causing the best possible outcome overall.  Instead, the deterrence theory is more 
interested in punishing wrongdoers with the explicit intent to prevent future crimes by creating a 
deterrent for would-be criminals or would-be-again criminals.  In a perfect world, the deterrence 
theory of punishment provides the most effective punishment such that the threat of punishment 
prevents (or deters) anyone from ever committing a crime and everyone would be better off for 
it.  If that could be achieved, then the consequentialist would claim that the punishment (or even 
merely the threat of punishment) had been perfectly justified. 
On the other end of the spectrum, retributivists (Kant 1788; Moore 1997; Zaibert 2006) 
claim that a punishment is justified only on backward-looking considerations.  That is, a 
punishment can only be justified when it is given to an individual who deserves to be punished 
for committing some wrong.  This justification asserts that when an individual acts in a way that 
is morally wrong, and when the relevant conditions are met such that she bears moral 
responsibility for her actions, it is then morally required that she suffer some hardship or harm 
for acting in that way.  In this way, the retributivist claims that a punishment is justified only 
4 
 
when it is able to harm an individual in the way that she deserves for her actions, and as long as 
it does this, considerations about the future outcome of this punishment need not be considered. 
Lastly, there exist numerous mixed justification of punishment which combine 
considerations for the future outcomes of a punishment, as well as ensuring that the individual is 
treated in the way that she deserves.  One popular justification for punishment of this kind is the 
moral education theory of punishment proposed by Jean Hampton (1983).  It takes the most 
important consideration to be the moral knowledge of the wrongdoer; similar to punishing a 
child to ensure that she knows hitting her sister is wrong, we punish criminals in order to teach 
that person our moral imperatives.  Thus, we punish an individual not only to be able to prevent 
future crimes from occurring, nor only to ensure that she gets what she deserves, but because she 
deserves to be punished and because we hope that she learns the value in not doing it again.  In 
this way, the moral education theory of punishment has elements that are both forward-looking 
and backward-looking, making it a mixed theory of punishment. 
In chapter one I explain each of these justifications of punishment in more detail, 
outlining numerous arguments and justifications for the use of state sanctioned punishment.  I 
provide a brief overview of the benefits that each theory of punishment has to offer, along with 
the kinds of punishments that are justified under each theory.  Then, in chapter two, I examine 
some of the flaws with each theory of punishment, paying close attention to when the theories 
recommend punishment in ways we normally think cannot be justified.  Ultimately, I argue that 
we actually have strong reasons for abandoning all three of the commonly held justifications of 
punishment.   
In chapter three I introduce the public health-quarantine (PHQ) model of punishment 
(Caruso 2016; forthcoming), which I argue succeeds in justifying punishment because it only 
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aims to harm individuals as little as possible (sometimes not at all) while focusing on removing 
the underlying causes of crime so that more people are less likely to be dangerous or harmful to 
society.  In extreme cases, when an individual is harmful or a danger to society, the PHQ model 
of punishment allows for incarcerating the individual in the same way that we would quarantine 
individuals with Tuberculosis or other dangerous and infectious diseases; it is a regrettable but 
necessary measure in order to protect society, but importantly does not propose any harmful 
consequences for the individual except that they are kept safely away from society.  In chapter 
three I discuss in more detail the ways in which the PHQ model succeeds in justifying 
punishment where the other three theories have failed, showing that it is a preferable theory of 
punishment to the others. 
In the final chapter, I expand on the PHQ model of punishment, suggesting that an 
important aspect of the model is that we must not neglect the health of the individual in favour of 
overall public health.  While the importance of social programs and education, as well as the 
safety of society is not to be denied, special focus must be allocated for ensuring individuals who 
have committed crimes receive the help they need to become functioning members of society.  In 
this chapter, I discuss how the PHQ model is able to deny the moral responsibility of individuals 
(therefore denying basic desert claims and the legitimacy of blame or praise for one’s actions), 
while still justifying the necessary harm done to them by incarcerating harmful individuals.  I 
then discuss the moral claim by Saul Smilansky (2011; 2016) that individuals who do not bear 
moral responsibility for their actions deserve compensation for being unfairly incarcerated, and 
that this undermines the possibility that the PHQ model could advance public health.  I argue that 
the PHQ model is able to accommodated this requirement, arguing that, as long as we are able to 
negate the bad brute luck which caused individuals to become wrongdoers, this is sufficient in 
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compensating them for the unfair incarceration.  I then discuss how it should not be a concern 
that this model of punishment overcompensates individuals such that imprisonment becomes an 
enjoyable and preferred experience to life on the outside. 
By taking my recommendation of ensuring the health of the wrongdoer, I provide an 
interpretation of the PHQ model which avoids the “mere means” objection to punishment.  That 
is, it ensures that wrongdoers are not merely used as a means of promoting the general wellbeing 
of society, but are treated as autonomous individuals who deserve the respect that is required of 
all people.  Most importantly, it ensures that dangerous wrongdoers who are incarcerated for the 
safety of society are helped as quickly and efficiently as possible, similar to the way in which we 
are obligated to treat those with dangerously infectious diseases who are quarantined to ensure 
they cannot unintentionally harm others.  By ensuring wrongdoers are treated this way, the PHQ 
model of punishment cannot lose sight of the needs of the individual in favour of the greater 
good for society.  In that way, my additional recommendations strengthen the PHQ model from 
some common (and often damning) objections to the justification of punishment. 
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Chapter 1 
1. Introduction 
This first chapter will be dedicated to expositing three of the most common justifications of 
punishment in the philosophical literature.  In each section, I will briefly outline one theory of 
punishment, discussing its strengths and implications for state-sanctioned punishment.  Then, in 
chapter 2, I will argue that each theory has independent moral reasons for thinking that there are 
key aspects in which the theory fails to justify punishment satisfactorily.  While there are 
certainly more than three theories of punishment (indeed, in chapters 3 and 4 I will introduce a 
fourth theory), I will be looking at three distinct types of justification – desert-based, deterrence-
based, and an expressivist view – such that if one can be shown to not be justified, then any 
relevantly similar theory of justice will likely fail to justify punishment in largely the same or 
similar ways.  Since I cannot respond to every single theory of punishment, I will focus on the 
most common theories of each type in order to show that the kinds of justification that have been 
provided, so far, have been insufficient. 
Any thorough examination of a topic, I think, should take some time to define its terms.  
In the case of punishment, however, it is not entirely obvious how to do so because so many 
philosophers have defined it differently (see, for example: Zaibert 2006; Hampton 1983; Hart 
1959; Rawls 1955).  For that reason, throughout the thesis, whenever I am discussing a particular 
philosopher’s view of punishment, I will provide additional clarification – where necessary – of 
how the term is being used.  For the moment, however, it will suffice to say that a punishment is 
an intentional harm which is inflicted in response to a wrongdoer’s action in the form of some 
suffering or hardship in which the wrongdoer has no choice (i.e., she cannot opt out of receiving 
the punishment).  For my own discussion of punishment, I am specifically interested in the state-
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sanctioned variety.  That is, I am interested in when and why it is morally permissible for the 
state to intentionally impose a harm on its citizens, and not in the kinds of punishment that a 
parent or teacher might give to a disobedient child. 
In section 2 of this chapter, I will discuss retributivism, the view that punishment of a 
wrongdoer is only justified because she deserves something bad to happen to her only in virtue 
of the fact that she has knowingly done something wrong (Pereboom 2014, 157).  Here, I will 
describe arguments that aim to morally justify retributive punishment.  I will also explain the 
retributive account of how the state should punish; that is, the retributive account of when a 
punishment is justified – or required – and what such a punishment would look like).  In section 
3, I discuss the deterrence theory of punishment, the view in which a punishment is only justified 
when it produces (or is reasonably believed to produce) an effective deterrent for crime (i.e., it 
causes would-be wrongdoers to choose not to commit a crime they otherwise would have).  In 
this section, I look at Rawls’ defense of the deterrence theory in which he adopts a rule utilitarian 
view of punishment that is justified in principle by deterrence, but which requires additional 
moral reasons in order for the practice of punishment to be justified.  Lastly, in section 4, I look 
at the moral education theory of punishment, the view that the goal of punishment should be to 
morally educate wrongdoers (and would-be wrongdoers in society) about the social norms and 
moral imperatives that exist, which will make those individuals behave morally in the future 
(Hampton 1984, 212).   
Ultimately, this chapter will provide an overview of three different theories of 
punishment along with how philosophers have typically argued they are justified.  The 
justifications are typically classified in three different ways: deterrence-based theories which are 
mostly forward-looking, desert-based theories which are mostly backward-looking, and a mixed 
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justification.  Forward-looking, consequentialist justifications, like the deterrence theory, are 
primarily focused on the consequences of a punishment.  That is, a punishment can only be 
justified when it produces the best outcomes (such as the public interest or the common good).  
Desert-based, backward-looking justifications, such as retributivism, claim that a punishment can 
only be justified when the wrongdoer receives what she deserves in a basic desert sense; that is, 
without any regard to the consequences of the punishment.  And, of course, the mixed 
justification of punishment combines elements of desert and deterrence in justifying punishment, 
but only in achieving some larger goal.  In the case of the moral education theory, that is to 
morally educate wrongdoers and to censure immoral acts.  In my discussion of the three 
particular theories of punishment, then, I will be discussing one theory of each kind of 
justification.  In chapter 2, I will then provide criticisms of these theories to show that not only 
can retributivism, deterrence, and moral education not justify punishment, but that there is reason 
to be sceptical of any of the justifications of punishment that utilize these kinds of justifications. 
 
2. Retributivism 
The retributivist believes that “a person who unjustifiably and inexcusably causes or risks harm 
to others or to significant social interests deserves to suffer for that choice, and he deserves to 
suffer in proportion to the extent to which his regard or concern for others falls short of what is 
properly demanded of him” (Berman 2008, 269).  In other words, if a person acts while knowing 
that the action is morally wrong and is not subject to factors which would impede responsibility 
for her actions (e.g., coercion, evil genius mind control, Cartesian demons), then that person 
deserves to suffer for her actions.  This view is particularly pervasive and intuitively appealing, 
especially among laypeople (Carlsmith et. al. 2002; Carlsmith 2008), but also in the 
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philosophical literature on punishment (see, for example: Morris 1968; Mackie 1982; Moore 
1997; Dimock 1997; Zaibert 2006).  For this reason, retributivism seems to be a natural place to 
start a chapter that reviews different justifications of punishment; starting with the oldest, most 
widely held view and working toward the newest views. 
 Punishment claims to be a justified act of deliberately harming or causing an individual to 
suffer.  All else being equal, we ordinarily take actions of deliberate harm to be morally 
unjustified.  So, if a punishment can be justified, there must be something special happening 
during acts of punishment which make it morally acceptable but that does not exist in merely 
harming another individual.  The obvious and relevantly different feature of a punishment from 
all other acts of harm, of course, is that a punishment is a specific harm that is done to a 
wrongdoer.  But it is not immediately clear which morally relevant imperatives are able to show 
us how harming a wrongdoer in particular makes the harm good (i.e., morally praiseworthy), so 
any sufficiently justified theory of punishment must tackle this difficulty. 
 
2.1 Possible Justifications of Retributive Punishment 
Michael Moore (1997, 101) claims that there are two strategies for justifying retributive 
punishment:  
(1) Showing how retributive punishment “follows from some yet more general principle 
of justice that we think to be true”; and 
(2) Showing that retributive punishment fits with a theory of punishment that “best 
accounts for those of our more particular judgments that we also believe to be true”. 
In the remainder of section 2, I will briefly look at several attempts to justify punishment by 
utilizing these strategies: first, by arguing that we deserve punishment when we feel guilty about 
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doing something wrong; second, by making the claim that wrongdoers owe a debt to society 
which can only be repaid by enduring some suffering; and third, asserting that when a wrongdoer 
suffers in the correct proportion for her wrongdoing, it is intrinsically good that she has done so 
(i.e., it is better that she suffers than not, given that she has done something wrong).  I will 
briefly describe how retributivists have argued in favour of these claims before I discuss the 
implications that this has on punishment; for example, what kinds of punishment are acceptable, 
and how severe the punishments ought to be in order to be justified.  
 
2.1.1 Guilt Implies Desert 
An interesting way to try to show that punishment best accounts for other judgments which we 
hold to be true (i.e., utilizing the second strategy of justifying punishment) is expressed by 
Moore when he imagines that, if he had committed a terrible crime, he hopes that his response 
“would be that I would feel guilty unto death” (1997, 145) and that “it is elitist and 
condescending toward others not to grant them the same responsibility and desert you grant to 
yourself” (1997, 148-149).  That is, we should assume individuals who feel guilty have the 
ability to know when they are actually guilty because they are the authority on whether or not 
their own subjective experiences are legitimate.  Moore claims that we should not, therefore, 
question if a wrongdoer might be mistaken about her feelings of guilt; we should instead assume 
that she is aware of the cause of her feelings, and only feels real, legitimate guilt when there is 
due cause.  In this way, Moore attempts to show that punishing the guilty is justified because 
guilty people feel that a punishment is deserved (“unto death” in some cases).  Thus, the fact that 
we feel guilty when we have done something wrong is supposed to show that retributive 
punishment fits with a theory of punishment that “best accounts for those of our more particular 
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judgments that we also believe to be true”, from Moore’s second strategy of justifying 
retribution. 
 On its own, this is not a sufficient justification of punishment because we can always 
doubt the authenticity or legitimacy of a person’s feelings of guilt.  For example, a child may feel 
guilty (and responsible) after her mother died of cancer, but we would never claim that her 
mother’s death is actually the child’s fault.  Even if we were to imagine ourselves in the shoes of 
the daughter, having experienced the same circumstances as her, it is very likely that we would 
feel guilty and responsible for our mother’s death as well.  Thus, it is not necessarily the case that 
feelings of guilt are unimpeachable and a clear indication that we deserve punishment.  Utilizing 
the second method alone, then, is not sufficient for justifying retributive punishment, although it 
might show that retributive punishment can only be justified when a wrongdoer ought to feel 
guilty about her actions.  In order to have a complete justification, this appeal to our “particular 
judgments” would have to be supplemented with other justifications that do not solely rely on 
our judgments that we usually assume to be true. 
 
2.1.2 Debt to Society 
Susan Dimock attempts to justify punishment by showing that retributive punishment follows 
from a more general principle of justice: that it is our duty or responsibility to maintain the trust 
of society by obeying the law.  By not obeying the law, we are breaking the trust of society 
which causes us to owe a debt that can only be repaid by enduring retributive punishment (i.e., 
suffering).  As Dimock says, “the harm of legal offenses is to be found in their violation of the 
conditions of basic trust in society, and we restore trust by punishing the offender” (Dimock 
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1997, 40).  In this way, Dimock claims that retributive punishment is justified only when it 
effectively restores trust in society.   
 Dimock argues that a social contract provides the necessary requirements for trust to exist 
between parties, and that, in a functional1 way, it is the central purpose of law to enable trust 
between individuals to exist (ibid., 45).  Moreover, the kind of objective trust that society 
provides can only exist while individuals in society are obeying the law; whenever one individual 
disobeys the law, this reduces our reason to believe that others in society are likely to be 
trustworthy, reducing the amount of trust overall.  “Knowing that our fellows have allowed us to 
be victimized without complaint and protest and condemnation, or that they are unwilling to 
assist us in providing protection against further abuse, would make trust of them, and not just of 
our violator, less objectively reasonable” (ibid., 51).  Therefore, in order to maintain the trust in 
society, and to repair any damage that might have been caused to it by a wrongdoer, Dimock 
asserts that censure must occur for the wrongdoer’s actions. 
 When an individual commits a crime, she harms society itself by making it harder for 
individuals to trust others in society.  Since the wrongdoer has agreed to maintain the trust of 
society by being a part of that society,2 she then owes a debt to repair the trust that she has 
broken. The only way to restore that trust, Dimock claims, is to retributively punish the 
wrongdoer.  This is so that “when trust between members of society has been violated, trust in 
the law as capable of maintaining the conditions of trust must be reaffirmed” and punishing the 
criminal “serves to reestablish that trust and demonstrates that individuals need not adopt 
                                                 
1 Here I mean “functional” in the sense that it is a functionalist view of government in which government’s 
functional purpose is to provide the means of trust between parties. 
2 Dimock takes a contractarian position regarding membership of society.  This is important because it implies the 
duty of the citizen to maintain society’s standards and norms. 
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recourse to anticipatory violence as a means of protecting their interests against those who are 
willing to harm” (ibid., 54).   
 This justification of retributivism utilizes the first strategy of Morris’s to argue that 
justice demands that wrongdoers be retributively punished in order to maintain the trust that is 
essential to society.  It does not, however, provide very strong reasons for believing that 
retributive punishment is the only way in which the objective trust of society can be restored; at 
best, it offers us the suggestion that people will only be satisfied that trust has been objectively 
restored when there has been retributive punishment for the wrongdoer.  It seems, though, that 
this may simply be empirically false: that members of society could be assured that they do not 
have reason to doubt the trust in society through other methods.  For instance, the Alliance for 
Safety and Justice reports that victims of violent crime want to see less spending on prisons, 
shorter prison sentences, and greater focus on the rehabilitation of criminals (2016).  This does 
not prove that individuals would be reassured in the trust of society through means other than 
retributive punishment, but it might suggest that others exist.  For this reason, I think that if 
retributive punishment can be morally justified and shown to be morally required, that some 
argument must be made in favour of the goodness of punishment in and of itself, without 
reference to consequences that could apparently be satisfied through methods other than 
retributive punishment. 
 
2.1.3 Intrinsic Goodness of Deserved Punishment 
Leo Zaibert attempts to provide us with an argument for the intrinsic value of punishment, 
claiming that when a wrongdoer suffers in the correct proportion for her wrongdoing, it is 
intrinsically good that she has done so.  That is, given that the wrongdoer has done something 
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wrong, harming that person in the amount deserved actually produces a morally good outcome.  
In this way, Zaibert would like to say that retributive punishment is morally better than no 
punishment at all, no matter what the consequences would be in either case. 
In Zaibert’s theory of punishment, the driving normative force of the argument is in the 
claim that it is intrinsically good when one gets what one deserves.  In order to see how Zaibert 
argues for this, I must quickly discuss Organic Wholes (or organic unity), which are described by 
G.E. Moore: “the value of a whole must not be assumed to be the same as the sum of the values 
of its parts” (Moore 1903, §18).  Essentially, even if the intrinsic value of each individual action 
may be negative, the value of the whole (i.e., the sum of the individual actions) may yet be 
positive.  Relating this to retributivism, a wrongdoer may act in a way that is wrong and 
therefore deserve to be punished.  The punishment in and of itself is prima facie intrinsically bad 
because it causes a harm to another individual; however, when the punishment is given 
retributively (i.e., with the correct proportion) to an individual who deserves exactly that 
punishment, an intrinsically good thing has occurred.  The organic whole, then, is intrinsically 
good, even while its individual parts are intrinsically bad. 
Zaibert’s argument for an intrinsically good organic whole in the case of punishment 
comes from his treatment of an example taken from Michael Moore’s Placing Blame: A Theory 
of Criminal Law (1997).  The example is meant to show that it can be intrinsically good to 
punish even when no further beneficial consequences can be obtained:3 
Consider Michael Moore’s sensible condemnation of that sordid spectacle 
of “fraternity boys” throwing parties outside the prison’s gates while 
executions take place.  … Retributivists may recommend the punishment 
of the fraternity boys celebrating at the prison’s gates independently of 
any consequences that this punishment might have.  Consequentialists can 
perhaps do it as well, but, unlike retributivists, they do not have an 
                                                 
3
 i.e., the punishment will not necessarily deter future crimes or provide any other intrinsically valuable 
consequences, other than the intrinsic good which arises from giving the wrongdoer the punishment he deserves. 
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obvious argument available.  Consequentialists, moreover, face an uphill 
battle in the sense that to punish those who celebrate punishments which 
are sanctioned by consequentialist rationales might send confusing 
messages.  In other words, if punishment X is justified because it brings 
about consequence Y, celebrating the infliction of punishment X will, in 
principle, contribute to bringing about more consequences Y … For those 
of us who believe that the fraternity boys are doing something wrong 
when they throw parties outside prison gates where executions take place, 
retributivism provides a much clearer rationale for punishing them than 
does consequentialism. 
 
The rationale for the retributivist is simply that the fraternity boys have done something 
morally wrong by celebrating the execution of some criminals, and therefore deserve to be 
punished.  The consequentialist, on the other hand, must provide a story about why it is worse for 
the greater benefit of society, and how punishing those individuals will help society overall.  The 
tricky part about the example is that the fraternity boys appear to be promoting a state sanctioned 
punishment, so it is not intuitively obvious how their celebrating is actually worse for society 
than if they were to show compassion for the wrongdoers being executed.  The retributivists, 
however, have a much simpler time explaining why the fraternity boys should be punished, as 
they are “concerned centrally with the intrinsic goodness of the organic whole whereby the 
deserving get what they deserve, [and] are from the start sensitive to taking seriously the intrinsic 
goodness and badness of certain actions, and of the way in which these discrete actions combine 
to form organic wholes which themselves can be of greater or smaller value than the value of 
their constituent parts” (Zaibert, p. 213).  Essentially, the fraternity boys, in celebrating the 
execution of criminals, are doing something intrinsically bad and are therefore deserving of 
punishment.  To punish them, then, will be morally good as it will bring about an organic whole 
that is intrinsically good (i.e., good in and of itself and not dependent on the consequences of the 
punishment). 
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Zaibert sums up his theory of punishment in this way: “To be a retributivist is not merely 
to claim that desert is a necessary condition for the infliction of just punishment, nor quite to 
claim that it is a sufficient condition either.  To be a retributivist is to recognize that deserved 
punishment is an intrinsic good” (p. 214).  Lastly, he adds the caveat that “the fact that 
something is intrinsically good does not make it the case that to bring it about is, willy-nilly, the 
right thing to do” (p. 214).  That is to say that, even though it is a good thing to punish the 
deserving, there are a host of other factors which might confound the appropriateness of 
punishing the deserving in certain situations.  Therefore, punishment is intrinsically good (when 
it is deserved), but not always the right course of action to take (i.e., providing the most desirable 
outcome, even if it might provide one desirable outcome).  Zaibert, in contrast to Dimock, is not 
making the strong positive desert claim that wrongdoers ought to be punished and it is morally 
good if they are, but rather makes the claim that when retributively punishing the deserving, it is 
merely an intrinsic good.  Or, put another way, Zaibert supports the negative desert claim that it 
is never justified for the state to punish the undeserving (e.g. the innocent), but wrongdoers lose 
the right to not be punished by the state and it may be permissible to punish, provided further 
justification.  Zaibert’s position does not necessitate the instantiation of the punishment merely 
on the grounds that it is an intrinsic good, but he does provide us with an argument for showing 
that sometimes causing a harm can be good.  This, I think, provides the strongest reason in 
favour of retributivism out of the three I have discussed in this chapter. 
 
2.3 Retributivism Conclusion 
In discussing retributivism, I have discussed several different strategies for justifying retributive 
punishment, which attempt to provide moral reasons showing that it is better for a wrongdoer to 
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be harmed than not harmed, without making any reference to the consequences of the 
punishment.  That is, the retributivist attempts to justify punishment only insofar as it is good in 
virtue of the fact that it is deserved or otherwise morally required.  By arguing that punishment is 
justified in this way, we can determine that any kind of punishment can be justified, as long as it 
is administered in the amount deserved.  Fines, imprisonment, community service, menial tasks, 
or even capital punishment are all kinds of punishment that the retributivist position could 
potentially recommend.  For example, we might think that a more severe crime, like murder, 
deserved to be punished with life in prison, while a less severe crime, like speeding, might be 
punished with a simple fine.  But as long as the punishment harmed the wrongdoer in the amount 
deserved, then any punishment could, in principle, be justified.  Usually, retributivists argue that 
the punishment deserved is proportional to the wrong committed.  For example, for Dimock, the 
deserved punishment would correlate to the amount of damage that the individual has done to the 
trust of society; the more society’s trust had been damaged, the more severe the punishment the 
wrongdoer deserved.  
The proportionality of the punishment is a key aspect of the retributivist position.  In the 
following section, I will describe a theory of punishment that is not at all concerned with the 
severity of punishment proportional to the severity of the crime.  The deterrence theory of 
punishment will provide an alternative goal for what punishment hopes to achieve, which will 
show how different theories of punishment can greatly change the kinds of punishment that are 
recommended.  While the retributivist theory is principally concerned with ensuring that the 
wrongdoer is punished in the amount that she deserves, we will see that the deterrence theory is 
not concerned with this at all, instead favouring punishments which bring about the best 
consequences. 
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3. Deterrence Theory 
Retributivism is often measured up against, and contrasted with, the consequentialist theory of 
punishment as the other side of the debate to the strictly deontological, desert-based retributivist 
position.  Which makes it strange, then, when we learn that there are very few strict 
consequentialists about theories of punishment; most contemporary philosophers who oppose 
retributivism offer mixed theories that incorporate both consequentialist and deontological 
considerations in order to justify punishment.  Yet any paper that defends retributivism will 
always point out that there exists a “classic debate”4 between retributive and utilitarian theories 
of punishment that has been ongoing for time immemorial.  At least lately, then, it seems like 
one side of the debate has been talking to an empty room.  Nevertheless, a survey of 
justifications of punishment would not be complete without a brief discussion to at least show 
why very few people strictly adhere to the deterrence theory. 
In this section of the chapter, I will outline the main features of a deterrence theory of 
punishment before discussing some of the limitations that are normally discussed which work 
against the theory’s justification.  The substantive part of this section will be used to discuss John 
Rawl’s defence of a deterrence theory of punishment (1955), where I will look at his arguments 
in favour of justifying the institution of punishment with utilitarian values, but not the individual 
instances of a punishment.  This will ultimately provide an alternative justification of punishment 
from the retributivist theory, and, to conclude, I will discuss the differences in how each theory 
recommends we punish wrongdoers. 
                                                 
4 Joel Feinberg, “The Classic Debate”, The Philosophy of Law 4th Edition, eds, Joel Feinberg and Hyman Gross 
(Belmont, California; Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1991). 624-629 
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3.1 Deterrence Overview 
The deterrence theory of punishment usually takes as its primary goal maximally increasing the 
safety of a society by reducing recidivism and deterring crime in general.  The theory claims that 
any actions which bring about this goal, including punishment, are justified.  In theory, a 
punishment is able to do this by providing a strong incentive not to act in such a way which will 
result in the punishment occurring.  This is easily shown in an example: Rob wants a hundred 
dollars, and he happens to be in a convenience store.  The store, he knows, has a hundred dollars 
in the cash register, and the cashier has recently gone to the bathroom.  Rob could easily open the 
cash register and take a hundred dollars.  Since Rob knows that robbing a store is illegal, 
however, he might be punished for theft (assuming the necessary contingencies are in place that 
make his apprehension by the police a possibility).  Rob does not want to be punished for theft, 
so he chooses not to act on his desire for a hundred dollars by robbing the store.  Due to the 
threat of punishment Rob has been deterred from robbing the store. 
The mechanisms at play in deterring a crime are simple enough to intuitively grasp:  
(1) the negative consequence (i.e., the punishment) must outweigh the positive 
consequences of committing the crime,  
(2) the punishment seems likely to occur to the individual,  
(3) the individual should be able to rationally consider those factors and come to the 
conclusion that the action is not in their best interest.   
A purely utilitarian view will not insist that the punishment is always enforced for the best 
possible outcome in all situations.  There may indeed be instances where alternative methods to 
punishment produce better results, and in those situations punishment cannot be justified to 
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increase the safety of a society.  For the purpose of this discussion, however, it is useful to 
discuss a deterrence theory of punishment where punishing wrongdoers can be the most effective 
method of providing a safe society.  In chapter 2, I will be pointing out several reasons that we 
might think that punishment is rarely – or at least less frequently than one might assume – a 
justified way of producing a safe society. 
Although not a view held by many philosophers, the deterrence theory of punishment is 
often espoused by politicians and others who want to “crack down” on violence and other 
crimes.  It is a frequent and – as I will argue later – unfortunately held belief that if we make 
punishments more severe, it will deter the wrongdoers of the world from continuing to do wrong 
and the world will be a better place.  In the following few pages I will quickly outline some of 
the limitations and arguments against deterrence as a theory of punishment.  I will then briefly 
examine one influential argument from John Rawls (1955) which defends a rule utilitarian view 
of the deterrence theory from these limitations and provides a potential way for the theory to 
remain justified, at least in principle, if not in practice. 
 
3.2 Rule Utilitarian Justification of Deterrence 
The strict utilitarian claims that the ends always justify the means, and that it is morally good if 
the best possible outcomes are achieved (for utilitarians like Bentham (1789) and Mill (1843; 
1859; 1861), this meant bringing about the greatest good, where “good” is simply happiness).  In 
regards to punishment, this might mean that whatever actions are required to bring about the 
safest society (i.e., make people the happiest overall) are morally obligated.  However, this 
means that it might sometimes be morally justifiable to punish the innocent and punish more 
harshly than a wrongdoer proportionally deserved for the crime committed, simply because it 
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would bring about the best results.  For example, framing an innocent person for murder, and 
punishing her severely (e.g., capital punishment), may provide an effective deterrent to other 
would-be murderers.  But, since we usually hold the intuition that punishing individuals can only 
be morally justified when they have actually committed a crime, and only with the severity that 
the crime calls for (i.e., proportional to the severity of the crime), then if the deterrence theory 
recommends punishing in ways that go against that intuition, we feel that it cannot be justified.   
Rawls defends the deterrence theory against this objection by making a distinction: “one 
must distinguish between justifying a practice as a system of rules to be applied and enforced, 
and justifying a particular action which falls under these rules; utilitarian arguments are 
appropriate with regard to questions about practices, while retributive arguments fit the 
application of particular rules to particular cases” (Rawls, 1955, p. 5).  Instead of arguing that a 
utilitarian theory like the deterrence theory must be changed or have caveats which ensure the 
guilt of the individual and a correctly proportional punishment, Rawls proposes that “stating 
utilitarianism in a way which accounts for the distinction between the justification of an 
institution and the justification of a particular action falling under it” (ibid. p. 10) is sufficient to 
assuage our worries regarding the possible tyranny of deterrence. 
By making this distinction, Rawls argues that we can justify punishment in general 
because of its ability to deter, but punishing in particular cases requires additional considerations 
that a consequentialist theory cannot provide.  For example, we might say that the practice of 
punishing wrongdoers is justified because it shows others that there are bad consequences for 
wrongdoing, which deters them from committing wrongs, but we cannot make an example out of 
one particular wrongdoer (or innocent person) by severely harming her, even if it could be shown 
to maximally deter everyone else from committing a crime.  The reason for this is because of our 
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other moral concerns for the individual that are not being addressed by the utilitarian objective: 
we do not think it is morally acceptable to harm someone when they have not done anything to 
deserve a particular treatment.   
This position is a rule utilitarian account of the deterrence theory of punishment: it 
justifies an intentional infliction of harm as punishment to the extent that it will reduce the 
overall level of crime, therefore increasing overall happiness, but this justification is constrained 
by other considerations we deem to be valuable.  This means that, since we do have other 
considerations we hold to be morally true (namely: it is not morally acceptable to harm the 
innocent or to punish a wrongdoer too harshly), then rule utilitarianism prohibits punishing in 
those circumstances.  Thus, Rawls provides us with an account of the deterrence theory of 
punishment that circumvents our initial concerns for the justification of the theory.  As I will 
show in the next section, however, it is still not quite sufficient for giving us a completely 
justified account of the deterrence theory of punishment. 
 
3.3 Deterrence Conclusion 
Deterrence is a hugely popular justification of punishment among politicians and people who 
generally think that the threat of harsh punishments is effective in preventing crime.  Since the 
deterrence theory is able to justify punishing innocent people, however, the philosophical 
community has been much more hesitant to proclaim themselves proponents of the theory.  Still, 
Rawls has shown that the theory is able to provide a justification for the institution of 
punishment as a deterrent.  In the next chapter, I will discuss several other reasons we may have 
for believing that the deterrence theory cannot be justified, or at least should be abandoned in 
favour of some other theory. 
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 In the next section, I will look at the moral education theory.  This theory, similar to 
Rawls’ version of the deterrence theory, has elements of both the forward-looking and backward-
looking justification of punishment.  However, while Rawls is principally interested in justifying 
punishment on its ability to deter, the moral education theory has the advantage of expressing our 
disapproval of morally bad actions.  This difference is important, since the deterrence theory is 
not interested in expressing that we think an action is wrong, only that if you act in a particular 
way, then you will be punished. 
 
4. Moral Education Theory 
Section 2 and Section 3 discuss two diametrically opposed justifications of punishment.  One in 
which punishment is only ever justified when it is given to a wrongdoer in the amount deserved 
(i.e., in the basic desert sense, without any regard to the consequences of the punishment), and 
the other, in which it is justified only when it produces the best consequences.  This is only, 
however, insofar as we are trying to justify the institution of (state-sanctioned) punishment and 
not the act itself.  As far as the act of punishment itself, retributivists like Zaibert claim that 
consequentialist considerations are required to determine when the punishment is right as 
opposed to good (Zaibert 2006, 215), while consequentialists like Rawls admit that retributive 
concerns may also be needed to determine when punishing is right on a case by case basis 
(Rawls 1955, 5).  It seems, then, that even those who claim to be strictly retributivist or strictly 
consequentialist with regards to punishment, often admit of some value to other considerations.  
For this reason, it should be no surprise that the moral education theory utilizes both retributive 
and consequentialist reasons in order to justify punishment. 
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 This alternative to the retributive and deterrence justifications of punishment gauges 
whether a punishment is justified on its ability to provide moral knowledge.  That is, the object 
of a punishment is to teach the wrongness a particular act, either to the wrongdoer who 
committed the act, or to society as a whole.  In that way, the punishment contains both a 
backward-looking and a forward-looking aspect: the wrongdoer deserves to be punished because 
she acted immorally, and the end goal of the punishment is that she becomes morally educated as 
a result.  More than merely this, however, is that the wrongness of the action itself is expressed 
to the wrongdoer and others.  Censure, then, plays a significant role in the punishment as well.  
To close out this chapter, I will discuss the role that punishment plays in the moral education 
theory by discussing Jean Hampton’s account of the theory, as well as the key benefits of using 
punishment in order to express the wrongness of an action. 
 
4.1 Moral Education  
As a basic premise for justifying state-sanctioned punishment, the moral education theory 
supposes that laws are made based on ethical or moral imperatives.  That is, we make laws which 
express ethical requirements such as “don’t murder”, or for moral reasons, for example “drive on 
the right” to ensure all drivers’ safety (Hampton, p. 210).  For the purpose of discussion, let us 
assume that all laws successfully follow this guide in order to bypass concerns about unjust or 
immoral laws.  In this way, breaking the law is immoral, not only because the act of breaking the 
law is wrong, but because the action itself (regardless of the law) is also immoral.  Even if this is 
not actually the case in the real world, we can likely agree that this ought to be the case. 
The threat of negative consequences for breaking the law is a non-moral incentive to 
obey the law.  That is, there is a prudential deterrent (on top of the moral considerations) that is 
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provided from threatening to punish for committing a crime.  And following through with the 
threat – actually punishing the wrongdoer – is a way to “make good” on that threat and can be 
justified if it helps to deter additional crimes (Hampton, p. 211).  Provided a conception of law as 
“rules of obligation”5, the laws are meant to express the moral boundary between permissible 
and impermissible actions, and provide non-moral reasons for following the law. 
More than merely conditioning society to obey the law due to the negative consequences 
of committing a crime, however, the moral education theory asserts that “punishment is intended 
as a way of teaching the wrongdoer that the action she did (or wants to do) is forbidden because 
it is morally wrong and should not be done for that reason” (Hampton, p. 212).  Since individuals 
are able to reflect upon the reasons for these laws, they are intended to instruct an individual in 
identifying the moral boundary that is being crossed in breaking the law.  So not only do 
individuals not want to break a law because of the threat of punishment; upon reflection, they are 
also supposed to realize that breaking the law is morally wrong, and therefore should not be 
done. 
In describing the moral (and legal) boundary between right and wrong, the moral 
education theory does not only provide instruction to the wrongdoer who is punished, but also to 
others in society.  Consider laws against discrimination in hiring practices based on race.  
Punishing those who refuse to hire people of a particular race, then, is not only useful in showing 
the hiring manager that her unfair treatment of a particular group of people is wrong, but also 
others in society to identify the practice as immoral.  Since others are able to reflect on the 
                                                 
5 Hart, The Concept of Law (1961) discusses some laws as “rules of obligation” in instances when it is used to 
produce rules that must be obeyed under threat of some punishment (e.g. “drive the speed limit, or receive a 
speeding ticket”). 
27 
 
punishment of the individual, it is supposed that they are able to determine that it actually is 
wrong to discriminate in such a way, and that a punishment for doing so is deserved. 
The punishment of wrongdoers, for the moral education theory, is used to teach society 
the moral norms that ought to exist by clearly defining the boundary between moral and immoral 
actions (i.e., those actions that are punishable versus those that are not).  In addition to this 
educational aspect, however, is the expression of condemnation of an action which is lacking 
without the punishment.  In particular, Kahan argues that the public feels that imprisonment is a 
particularly effective method of expressing this, while alternatives are rejected “not because [the 
public] perceives that these punishments won’t work or aren’t severe enough, but because they 
fail to express condemnation as dramatically and unequivocally as imprisonment” (Kahan 1996, 
592). 
There are certainly ways of expressing that some particular actions are immoral without 
punishment.  For example, if we can reasonably expect laws to describe what we find to be 
moral or immoral, then simply providing everyone with a list of the laws would ostensibly be an 
effective method of expressing our disapproval of certain actions.  It would not, however, be able 
to provide a scale for how much we wish to condemn an action.  We could not, for example, say 
that “murder is -10g [goodness], while petty theft is -2g.”  Expressing the moral value of actions 
in this way would certainly fail to accomplish what we hope to achieve.  Instead, the infliction of 
a punishment might be able to accomplish this goal much better, since we can punish to a lesser 
or greater degree.  Murder, for example, may garner a punishment of life in prison, while the 
theft of a car might only require a year in prison.  In this case, there are clear, appreciable 
differences in how much worse we think murder is than theft, and the difference in punishments 
express the difference in our moral condemnation. 
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4.2 Moral Education Conclusion 
The moral education theory of justifies punishment when it is used for two purposes: first, for the 
wrongdoer’s own good; and second, to express the wrongness of the action.  In the first way, a 
punishment is meant to force the wrongdoer to reflect on her actions and determine how she was 
wrong.  Ideally, she will come to understand that she acted immorally and realize that she 
actually deserved the punishment that she received.  Moreover, if the punishment was given in 
the correct amount, she should also realize the severity of her actions; that is, if the punishment 
was quite harsh, for example, then she will realize the gravity of the action and that it was truly 
immoral and unacceptable.  The punishment also works to shape society by expressing the moral 
imperatives that others are meant to live by.  If everyone knows that stealing is wrong because 
people have been punished for stealing in the past, then fewer will consider stealing in the future. 
 Whether or not these motivations for punishment succeed is not entirely clear.  Indeed, in 
the next chapter I will argue that there are numerous reasons for thinking that they do not.  
However, the moral education theory provides a powerful description of why we may think that 
a punishment is justified.  It gives an intuitive description of why we want to punish wrongdoers 
(i.e., to express our disapproval of the action), and also an optimistic reason to think that we 
might actually be helping wrongdoers by punishing them if it successfully causes them to 
consider the moral reasons for not acting in a particular way. 
 
5. Conclusion 
I have now introduced three theories of punishment: the retributivist theory, deterrence theory, 
and moral education theory.  In describing these theories, I have noted that there are different 
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motivations for punishing wrongdoers that are either backward-looking (desert-based) or 
forward-looking (consequentialist) which inform why we punish wrongdoers and when we think 
it is justified to do so.  Whether our motivations are forward-looking or backward-looking, 
however, provide very different recommendations for how much, or even if, it is permissible to 
punish.  The retributivist theory, for example, may recommend an extremely harmful punishment 
like capital punishment, even though it arguably will never provide a moral education for the 
wrongdoer (indeed, how could it?).  On the other hand, the moral education theorist would 
vehemently deny that capital punishment could ever be justified.  Since these punishments 
conflict with each other (i.e., the moral education theorist thinks the retributivist punishment is 
unjustified, while the retributivist thinks the moral education punishment is unjustified) they 
cannot both be correct.  For this reason, then, it is important to discuss these different theories of 
punishment to determine which ones are justified and for what reasons, or even if they can be 
justified at all.  In the next chapter I will take a further look at the three theories of punishment 
discussed here, where I will argue that all of them have serious moral issues which indicates that 
none of them provide a complete justification of punishment.  
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Chapter 2 
1. Introduction 
Chapter one discussed several different motivations for punishment, utilizing conceptions of 
desert, deterrence, and moral education.  I described how theorists of punishment argue for one 
or more of these conceptions as a justification of punishment, which provides us with different 
reasons for punishing wrongdoers.  The different theories also provide us with conflicting 
information about when it is justified to punish a wrongdoer, the amount the wrongdoer ought to 
be punished, and the kind of punishment that ought to be endured.  The retributivist and 
deterrence theorist, for example, may be able to endorse capital punishment in principle, while 
the moral education theorist seems less likely to accept it as a justifiable kind of punishment.  
And while each theory of punishment might be internally consistent, I have done very little to 
compare and contrast the different theories to show which one (if any) might be more justified 
than the others. 
 In this chapter, I will be criticizing each of the different theories of punishment discussed 
in chapter 1.  In each of the proceeding sections I will identify one distinct objection to 
punishment which provides strong reason for rejecting at least some of the competing 
justifications of punishment.  I then compare and contrast the theories together, identifying 
which are able to resist the objection and which would need to be modified.  Ultimately, I will 
show that each of the three theories discussed in chapter 1 has at least one strong reason for 
believing that it does not satisfactorily justify punishment. 
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2. Free Will and Moral Responsibility Scepticism 
One useful way to talk about free will and moral responsibility is a way in which you cannot 
have one without the other.6  If free will is understood to mean the ability to act on one’s 
decisions without the interference of outside influences, and to have moral responsibility is to 
have complete ownership over one’s actions, then this is a way in which one must also have free 
will in order to have moral responsibility.  That is, if nothing other than one’s own intentions and 
actions bring about a desired event, then it would be reasonable to say that she has full 
responsibility for that outcome.  And if it is only possible to have complete ownership over an 
outcome if one’s intentions and desires had not themselves been manipulated or influenced by 
factors outside of her control, then if she acted with full moral responsibility for her action, she 
must have acted with free will. 
There are two positions we can take on this.  Either we do have complete ownership over 
our actions, or we do not.  In order to be held ultimately morally responsible for our actions, an 
individual must have acted with free will.  This generally means at least one of two things must 
be true: (1) if time were reversed to a point just before an individual made a decision, that 
individual could, in principle, make a decision different from the one she had made before time 
had been reversed; (2) the individual must be able to make decisions without outside influence 
(i.e., the individual must be causa sui – “cause of oneself”; her decisions cannot be externally 
caused).  The free will libertarian believes that we could make a different decision if we went 
back in time to a point just before choosing to do something7 because we are not (always) 
                                                 
6 For further discussion of different views of free will and moral responsibility, see Vargas, M. (2013) “How to Solve 
the Problem of Free Will”. The Philosophy of Free Will. 
7 This does not mean that we would make another decision, just that we had to ability to do so in principle. 
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causally determined to act.  That is, we have the ability to make decisions without being 
influenced by factors that are beyond our control.  The hard determinist, on the other hand, 
believes that we are causally determined such that both (1) and (2) must be false.  That is, our 
actions are always the result of past events, and if events occurred in the exact same way, we 
would always make the same decisions.  We also cannot be the ultimate source of our actions, 
since causal events which ultimately result in our actions have been happening since long before 
we had any ability to control them.  Lastly, the compatibilist denies (1) and (2) are required for 
free will altogether because she defines free will so that we do not require complete freedom 
from outside influence in order to still have free will. 
 The compatibilist understanding of free will is somewhat less strict in what constitutes an 
exercise of free will.  To the compatibilist, an action that was caused with one’s free will merely 
means an action one intended to carry out while not under duress (e.g. coercion).  Similarly, a 
compatibilist might say that one has moral responsibility for an action just in case what she 
intended to happen (without being coerced) is also what actually happened.  For example, if I 
intend to throw a baseball to a catcher and – barring some unforeseeable and unavoidable event – 
I succeed, then this would be an action of free will that I would have moral responsibility for.  If, 
however, I only threw the ball out of anger because my child had recently been hurt by the 
catcher, the compatibilist would still say I acted with free will and am therefore morally 
responsible, while a hard determinist would say that I did not have free will and therefore was 
not ultimately morally responsibility for the action because it was in some sense caused by the 
actions of the catcher.   
In addition to the three views of free will (i.e., compatibilism, libertarian free will, and 
determinism) which describe what free will is and what it would take to have it, there is also the 
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sceptical position.  As opposed to the other positions which claim that we can have free will only 
if certain conditions hold true, the free will sceptic, on the other hand, maintains that no how we 
describe it, there is no way that people have enough free will to bear ultimate morally 
responsible for our actions.  That is to say, no matter where one stands on the free will debate, 
the free will sceptic argues that it is impossible to possess the kind of control that is necessary in 
order to be blamed or praised for our actions.  This is because, ultimately, our actions were not 
caused by us, but by events over which we had no control, which does not leave room for 
ultimate moral responsibility. 
In this section I will argue that, in order to deserve punishment in the basic desert sense, 
we must have the kind of ultimate moral responsibility and free will that is only acquired when 
our actions are not causally determined such that we could choose otherwise or that we are the 
ultimate cause of our actions (i.e., when either (1) or (2) is true).  Moreover, I will show that we 
do not have free will or moral responsibility in this way, regardless of whether determinism or 
libertarianism is true. To do this I will argue that we always, in every circumstance, lack the kind 
of control that is necessary for moral responsibility.  I will then show that without this sort of 
moral responsibility, we cannot deserve to be punished, which ultimately undermines any 
justification of punishment that is ultimately concerned with the harm that a wrongdoer deserves 
in the basic desert sense. 
Suppose that determinism is true.  In that case, literally all of our actions are causally 
determined, including the brain state that makes you think you want to do something, so that 
when you act, it is only because of those preceding causal events.  For example, suppose an 
individual wants to rob a bank.  The desire to do so, if determinism is true, is entirely caused by 
factors outside of her control so that, even if she were to go back in time a hundred times, those 
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factors would still influence her to want to rob a bank.  In this way, she cannot possibly desire 
anything else, since those factors will always cause her to want the same thing.  As a result of 
this, it seemingly does not make sense to blame her for wanting to rob the bank, since, in any 
meaningful way, it is not her fault that she wants to do so.  That is to say, she is not the ultimate 
cause of her own desires because she cannot control the factors which influence them, and thus, 
she cannot be held ultimately morally responsible for having them. 
On the other hand, if indeterminism is true and we have libertarian free will, then our 
wants and desires are not caused by previous events and our actions amount to nothing more than 
random chance.  One common argument in favour of libertarian free will is to suggest that 
quantum mechanics shows that not everything is causally determined.  Instead, they say that all 
events have fundamentally stochastic outcomes that are probabilistic instead of certain.  Without 
committing them to mind-body dualism, then, the libertarian can claim that this leaves room for 
an individual to act on decisions that are not causally determined.  This, too, is insufficient 
control (or ownership) of the outcome of our actions in order to have moral responsibility.  Even 
if there is an element of randomness in our actions, it does not leave room for our wills to act 
independently of outside factors; since, if it is the case that we are able to form desires or the will 
to act in isolation of outside factors, those desires would amount to nothing more than a random 
(or probabilistic) outcome that are not based on anything that we have actual ownership over.  In 
this way, even if the world is not causally determined, there is no point in which free will is 
possible. 
Still other free will sceptics claim that we lack free will and moral responsibility because 
of the pervasiveness of luck (Levy 2011).  That is, we cannot have free will because, no matter if 
everything is causally determined or not, the vast majority of the circumstances we find 
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ourselves in, our ability to act, and our desires are the result of either good or bad luck.  And 
since almost everything (or, indeed, everything) is the result of luck, then we cannot say that an 
individual deserves blame or praise for her actions in the basic desert sense – i.e., to morally 
deserve a punishment in and of itself, regardless of the consequences or positive outcomes of the 
punishment – since she cannot bear full or ultimate moral responsibility for her actions. 
To briefly discuss these implications for the justification of punishment, let me return to 
the compatibilist position.  As I discussed above, the compatibilist is comfortable with saying 
that the world is causally determined, but claims that we have free will just in case we are able to 
act in the way that we desire.  In this way, even if determinism is true, we can still say that we 
have “free will” and “moral responsibility” for our actions, but only because we have moved the 
goalposts to include degrees of responsibility where we never have complete or ultimate control 
over our actions, but enough to say that we have some responsibility for our actions.  The 
obvious question, then, is to what degree can an individual be morally responsible for her 
actions?  If she is able to exert, say, control over 90% of the factors which ultimately cause her to 
act in a particular way, then we might say that she deserves most of the responsibility for her 
actions.  However, we have good reason to believe that she controls very little (or, more likely, 
none) of the factors which eventually cause her to act in particular ways.  For example, the when 
I threw a ball at the catcher, I had no control over the fact that he hurt my child, nor the fact that 
him doing so made me angry.  So how much control did I have over my actions?  I would say 
none at all, once literally everything that went into determining the action had been accounted 
for. 
Now, in terms of moral responsibility, it seems that in every case there is very little 
reason to think that we ever have ultimate control over our actions.  For that reason, then, we 
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should also have very little reason to think that we have ultimate moral responsibility for our 
actions.  Therefore, any theory of punishment which requires moral responsibility for an action 
in order to justify the punishment will necessarily fail to accomplish this goal if the free will 
sceptic’s position is correct. 
 The retributivist theory of punishment, of course, holds that a punishment is only 
deserved when a wrongdoer bears moral responsibility for her immoral action.  And, since she 
can only bear moral responsibility if she were able to use free will, but – as we already discussed 
– since there is very good reason to believe that she does not have free will in the relevant way, 
then she cannot have the requisite moral responsibility for a deserved punishment.  Therefore, if 
the free will sceptic is correct, individuals cannot deserve punishment in the basic desert sense 
and retributivist punishment cannot be justified. 
The deterrence theory, on the other hand, does not require the moral responsibility of a 
wrongdoer in order to justify punishment, so it is compatible with the free will sceptic’s position.  
The moral education theory, too, must be compatible with this view, since punishments are only 
“deserved” in the sense that wrongdoers require the punishment in order to teach them moral 
behaviour and to express the wrongness of their actions to others.  Thus, the free will sceptical 
argument, if convincing, harms the justification of the retributivist theory, but does not affect 
either the deterrence theory or the moral education theory. 
 
3. Retributivism 
In chapter 1, I briefly described how both Moore and Zaibert’s arguments claim that a 
punishment need not have good consequences in order for it to be morally good.  Each of these 
arguments presents a view of retributivism which is intuitively appealing; it provides an intuitive 
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case for why it is morally acceptable for state-sanctioned, retributive punishment.  In the next 
few pages, though, I will argue that we have strong reasons for believing there is no intrinsic 
value in harming wrongdoers by providing a counterexample to the Fraternity Boys example 
from chapter 1. 
 The bare bones of Zaibert’s justification for punishment is this: The punisher must 
believe that a person is deserving of blame for her action.8  The punisher then does something 
which she believes will be painful9 to the blameworthy person in an act of (retributive) revenge.  
When the harm inflicted is correctly administered in the amount deserved, an organic whole 
which is intrinsically good is produced.  When the organic whole is intrinsically good, the 
punishment is therefore justified – provided other confounding factors do not exist that would 
make the punishment unjustified/inappropriate. 
 One way to attack this justification of punishment – which I think ultimately fails, but is 
worth mentioning – is simply an epistemic scepticism.  There does not seem to be any principled 
manner in which a punisher could be sure that an organic whole with positive intrinsic value had 
been produced by punishing a wrongdoer, either because it is impossible to know the wrongdoer 
was really responsible for her actions, or that it is impossible to know if the correct (retributive, 
proportional, appropriate) amount of punishment had been administered.  At best, we might 
accept that a good had been produced in the rare case where both the punisher and the wrongdoer 
felt that the punishment was justified. Or, perhaps less satisfyingly, in the event where the 
punisher is pretty sure that the wrongdoer was justly punished. 
                                                 
8
 i.e., the punisher believes that the individual has done something wrong and that she ought to feel guilty for her 
action – even if she does not feel guilty. 
9
 “Painful” could also be substituted for harmful, unpleasant, etc.  It does not necessitate the type of harm involved 
either; this could include mental, physical, emotional, or financial pain, among others. 
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 It is entirely possible, though, that the retributive theorist might accept that in practice we 
could never be certain that an intrinsically good organic whole had been produced, but that does 
not undermine the fact that there would, in theory, be justified instances of retributive 
punishment.  More interesting, in my opinion, is how we might argue that that retributive 
punishment fails to guarantee the intrinsic value of the punishment, and therefore cannot be a 
necessary or sufficient condition in justifying the punishment. 
To do this, let us first consider why we might think that retributively punishing an 
individual will necessarily produce an organic whole that is intrinsically good.  Zaibert thinks, 
and most other retributivists who hold similar views would agree, that this is the case because 
getting what one deserves is intrinsically good.  On the face of it, this seems intuitively plausible 
simply because of our understanding of the word “desert.”  If I get what I deserve then the world 
seems to be functioning as it should since I received exactly what I was owed.  We seem 
perfectly satisfied when a regular transaction between individuals works this way: if the owner of 
an object is paid that object’s value in order to part with it, then both parties should surely be 
satisfied with the exchange.  It seems, then, that the intrinsic value of being fairly paid your due 
is good overall.   
But this intuition does not seem to get us very far when we ask why it is intrinsically 
good, and if it is necessarily good in all cases.  For example, is it necessarily good even in cases 
where getting what one deserves is, on its own (i.e., in isolation – an organic part), an 
intrinsically bad thing, such as the harm that is caused to an individual from a punishment?  We 
might assert that it is a good thing, but explaining its goodness by appealing to the intrinsic 
goodness of getting what one deserves is simply question begging.  Justifying a punishment on 
the basis that the wrongdoer is “getting what she deserves” is placing all of the normative force 
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on the intrinsic goodness of desert, while the justification for the intrinsic goodness of desert is 
merely a language trick in which the word “desert” sneaks in its own intrinsic value. 
Consider, then, the intrinsic value of desert and the kind of desert the retributivist is 
talking about.  The kind of desert which can be justified by appealing to other things, such as the 
consequences of an action or the institutions in place which provide rules that must be followed, 
cannot be what we are talking about.  If, for example, we claimed that the fraternity boys who 
party outside of a prison where executions occur deserve to be punished because it will bring 
about desired consequences such as the deterrence of future partying, then we are not talking 
about the right kind of desert.  In those cases, we could simply discuss desert as a utility 
maximizing function, ignoring the intrinsic value of the thing itself in favour of utilitarian or 
consequentialist considerations.  Rather, we should be more interested in the basic desert 
described by Pereboom: “the agent would deserve to be blamed or praised just because she has 
performed the action, given an understanding of its moral status, and not, for example, merely by 
virtue of consequentialist or contractualist considerations” (Pereboom 2014, p.2).  This kind of 
desert is what the retributivist has in mind for justifying punishment, so it must be shown that 
when this kind of desert is fulfilled it is always intrinsically good.   
The intrinsic value in having a basic desert fulfilled (that is, to receive what is deserved), 
is supposed to be good in virtue of the fact that it is deserved.  It seems, though, that there exist 
confounding circumstances where it does not make sense to consider “getting what one 
deserves” an intrinsic good, even as an organic whole.  To show this, consider the following 
example: 
A young mother in a war-torn country must acquire enough food for herself and her small 
child to survive.  There are no jobs available where she can work for food or wages, there 
are no options for hunting, gathering, or scavenging food.  She has two (and only two) 
available options: 
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1. She can steal enough food for her family to survive (but not so much as to cause 
anyone else to starve), or 
2. She can allow herself and her family to starve. 
 
If we look at the mother’s options in isolation (purely considering the actions themselves, 
regardless of context), we can see that both of her options are intrinsically bad.  We ordinarily 
think that stealing is wrong (in and of itself), and also that allowing your family to starve is 
wrong (again, in and of itself), especially when another available option would prevent anyone 
from starving.  It seems, then, that no matter which action she decides to take, she will be 
deserving of some kind of punishment due to whatever immoral action she chooses.  We might 
say that the two deserve different punishments, but a punishment would be deserved nonetheless. 
According to the theory, then, Zaibert will be forced to conclude that punishing the 
mother will produce an intrinsically good organic whole (i.e., the punishment is good).  And 
while Zaibert uses the Fraternity Boys example to produce the intuition that punishing the 
deserving is good, it seems as though this example does the very opposite.  It seems as though in 
the case of the mother, punishing her should have no place in our consideration of how we 
should treat her actions.  Indeed, I think it would be very strange if we were to assert that the 
organic whole produced by punishing her, given the context, could be anything but intrinsically 
bad.  We might say that the only thing the mother reasonably deserves is some food, but 
certainly not punishment.  Nevertheless, Zaibert’s description of the theory will commit him to 
asserting that a punishment in this case is intrinsically good. 
Now, several things can be said in Zaibert’s defense.  First, arguing for the intrinsic 
goodness a deserved punishment, one might contest that the mother does not deserve, in the 
basic desert sense, to be punished because she is not culpable for her actions.  One might claim 
that, since the mother did not have the ability to choose an option that was intrinsically good, she 
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cannot be blamed for choosing an option that was intrinsically bad.10  Essentially, because she 
did not have the ability to choose a good option, she cannot be held accountable for doing 
something wrong.  An essential part of deserving a punishment, after all, is the freedom to have 
wilfully chosen to do the immoral action.  And since she did not have the freedom to choose the 
immoral action because it was the only real available option available to her, then she cannot 
deserve to be punished. 
On Zaibert’s view, however, this is not the correct assessment of the situation.  In order 
for someone to have done something intrinsically wrong, she need only have had the ability to 
freely11 choose to act immorally.  Supposing the mother decided to (rightly, in my view) steal 
enough food for her and her family to survive, she would have been culpable for the intrinsically 
wrong action.  Zaibert’s view of organic parts and wholes views wrong actions in isolation of the 
context of the situation.  As long as the individual acted with the relevant moral understanding of 
the intrinsic value of the action,12 and was not coerced into choosing the action, then she is 
blameworthy for the action, and – since it is intrinsically bad – thus deserves to be punished for 
it.13  And, ultimately, if the punishment is in the amount deserved, Zaibert will insist that an 
intrinsically good organic whole has been produced. 
Since the mother was aware of the intrinsic badness of stealing, and she freely chose to 
steal regardless of that fact, then that is all that is required to say that she acted intrinsically 
                                                 
10
 We might ostensibly blame her more if she does not choose the least intrinsically bad action, but as long as there 
are no good options, the least bad option will still be bad, in and of itself. 
11
 Here I mean “free” only in the thin sense that it is not coerced and the agent had the regular mental faculties to 
understand what she was choosing to do.  If Zaibert required a thicker sense of freedom for desert, then it seems that 
he might quickly lose the ability to say anyone could ever deserve punishment given that everyone is constrained 
and influenced by their environment (this is the free will scepticism argument that is discussed in the next section).  
12
 Zaibert also claims that it is possible for individuals to deserve punishment if they were not aware of the 
wrongness of their actions.  For example, if they acted negligently.  For my purposes, however, this is not relevant.  
13
 Zaibert discusses blame on pages 31 and 32 of his book.   
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badly.  A punishment, in the amount deserved, is then supposed to produce an organic whole that 
is intrinsically good.  We can see, then, that this first defense of Zaibert’s view does not succeed 
because Zaibert himself must deny it.  Meanwhile I think we would still like to claim that it 
would not be good if the mother were punished for her action, despite what a basic desert 
(retributivist) theory suggests. 
The second way that a retributivist might argue for the intrinsic goodness of punishing 
the mother, is that while punishing the individual for her wrongs in the amount deserved will 
produce an organic whole that is intrinsically good, it may still not be right to punish her due to 
other normative principles which we also hold (Zaibert p. 199).  Those other principles, 
presumably, would include the fact that the mother has no better option available to her, making 
it wrong to punish her in that circumstance.  In this way, though, Zaibert admits of a gap between 
the good and the right (Zaibert p. 215) which ensures that a retributive punishment can never 
justify a punishment by appeal only to the basic desert claim.  Instead, it could only ever make 
the negative claim that innocent people do not deserve to be punished (which, as far as I can tell, 
is not a terribly interesting conclusion). 
By claiming that it is always good to punish wrong actions, but not always right due to 
contextual considerations, punishment can never be justified without appeal to the positive 
consequences which would make it “right”.  In my example from above, then, the retributivist 
will claim that it is intrinsically good to punish the mother, but also wrong to do so (for hopefully 
obvious reasons).  If the act of punishing is wrong, as it appears to be in this case, then the 
punishment is unjustified.  This shows that there are clear instances where an individual might 
deserve to be punished in the basic desert sense, but punishing that individual for her actions 
would be unjustified.   
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This may not seem to be a particularly interesting conclusion, considering Zaibert is only 
attempting to justify a negative retributivist position: “to be a retributivist is not merely to claim 
that desert is a necessary condition for the infliction of just punishment, nor quite to claim that 
it is a sufficient condition either.  To be a retributivist is to recognize that deserved punishment 
is an intrinsic good” (ibid., 214).  However, it seems as though Zaibert provides us with an 
evaluation of desert that is unverifiable and unusable except to be able to apply the normative 
term “good” to, such that we can say that a punishment is “good” even when it is “wrong”.  In 
terms of how we ought to act in instances where the action is both good and wrong, Zaibert 
seems to recommend that we refrain from the action on the seemingly contradictory grounds that 
it is wrong to act in a way that is good. 
While the intrinsic goodness of deserved punishment appears to be internally consistent, 
it does not seem to capture the sort of justification of punishment that retributivists are looking 
for when they say that a punishment is deserved.  For instance, it does not justify punishment or 
tell us what to do in instances where all of the available options are intrinsically bad, or in 
situations where some necessary evil must be done for the greater good.  Instead, it merely 
preserves the notion that some actions are morally wrong, while others are good, and supposes 
that it is good to punish individuals when their actions are wrong.  But this amounts to mostly a 
language trick, since the action can be wrong while a punishment for that wrong may still be 
unjustified.  For this reason, the theory seems to be an argumentum ad absurdum which warrants 
simply abandoning it in favour of some other justification. 
The non-intrinsic goodness of deserved punishment, then, is another strong objection to 
the retributivist theory of punishment.  Since there are instances where “getting what one 
deserves” is not inherently good, then it is not clear that punishing wrongdoers retributively will 
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also be good.  Therefore, the retributivist cannot use the goodness of a deserved punishment as a 
justification for the retributive theory of punishment. 
On the other hand, I must note that this criticism of a basic desert justification of 
punishment does not harm Dimock’s justification of punishing retributively in order to restore 
trust in society.  This is because her justification does not rely on the wrongdoer deserving 
punishment in the basic desert sense.  Instead, her argument attempts to justify retributive 
punishment with the “by relation”,14 whereby the justifying state of affairs (restoring trust in 
society) happen by retributively punishing wrongdoers.  The claim is that “the punishment and 
its justifying event/state of affairs begin simultaneously and are non-causally related” (Dimock 
1997, 40).  This view claims to be retributivist not because the punishment is deserved, but the 
punishment is required in order to non-causally bring about the desired trust in society.  It still 
fails to be justified, however, for the reasons I discussed in chapter 1.  That is, we may have very 
good reason to think that there are empirically better methods of restoring trust in society than by 
punishing wrongdoers.  Indeed, in chapter 3 and 4 I argue that making prisons resemble life on 
the outside as much as possible, and harming prisoners as little as possible, has provided 
compelling evidence in being able to restore trust in society better than our current retributive 
penal systems.  
 
4. Deterrence Theory 
Briefly, I will mention three limitations that exist in the deterrence theory of punishment, but 
which are argued against by Rawls in his rule utilitarian justification of punishment.  If 
                                                 
14 For further details see Mark A. Michael, “Utilitarianism and Retributivism: What’s the Difference?”, American 
Philosophical Quarterly 29 (1992): 2. 
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punishment is purely meant to deter individuals, then these limitations will show instances where 
deterrence will not be an effective method of preventing crimes (or of providing a safe society).  
That is, some or all of the mechanics at play in deterring individuals will not be present, and 
thus, the potential wrongdoers will not be deterred by the punishment that is threatened for the 
wrongful act.  While Rawls provides reasons for thinking that deterrence cannot provide the only 
justification of punishment, the limitations of a purely deterrent-based theory of punishment are 
useful in showing why we might think that deterrence cannot justify punishment on its own.   
 
4.1 Limitations of the Deterrence Theory 
First, if the punishment is insignificant compared to the crime, then it cannot rationally deter an 
individual.  For example, if the punishment for stealing a car is a $5 fine, then a cost-benefit 
analysis will show that stealing the car will almost always be the rational choice.  Similarly, if 
the punishment appears exceptionally unlikely to happen, again it would be rational to commit 
the crime.  If I can steal a million dollars from a bank with only a one or two percent chance of 
being caught, in many situations I ought to choose to rob the bank (assuming my priority is my 
own self-interest without regard to any other moral considerations). 
Those two limitations can, in principle, be corrected in order to deter effectively: increase 
the severity of the punishment appropriately so that the negative consequences outweigh the 
positive consequences of committing the crime, and ensure there is a strong public perception 
that if an individual were to commit a crime, it is extremely likely that they will be caught and 
punished.15 Much harder to correct, however, is when the agent does not rationally consider the 
                                                 
15 There is a relatively recent paper which suggests that the severity of the punishment actually has little to do 
with the effectiveness of the punishment as a deterrent; rather, only the certainty of whether or not the individual 
will be punished has an effect on deterrence (Wright 2010).  I imagine, however, that the severity of the 
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negative consequences of committing a crime.  In this situation, no amount of punishment will 
be able to rationally deter the individual since she is not rationally considering the consequences 
of her desired action or its alternatives.  Crimes of passion – when individuals act in the heat of 
the moment, spontaneously, and without consideration for the consequences – for instance, may 
be instances where the agents involved do not have the ability to correctly identify alternative 
courses of actions, resulting in the agent “choosing” the only action which appears to be 
available to her.  In these instances, if the agent has chosen rationally, then it must have been 
from a very limited list of possible actions.  An outsider looking in on the situation would have 
been able to provide a longer list, but this is merely because the outsider was not constrained by 
the circumstances of the situation. 
Since the deterrence theory is strictly utilitarian or consequentialist, to be able to justify 
punishing individuals who do not have a significant amount of control over their actions, the 
punishment must be able to deter others from committing similar crimes (or the same individual 
from committing the same crime again).  When a crime is committed without any regard to the 
consequences, however, the threat of a punishment cannot hope to deter that crime.  In those 
situations, then, a punishment cannot be justified under the deterrence theory of punishment.  
This leaves us with the question of when, or even if, punishing those individuals will be effective 
for deterring future crimes of the same sort or when punishment should not be used as the source 
of deterrence. 
 While it may seem as though the above limitations do very little in limiting the scope of 
where punishing for the purpose of deterrence can be justified, it is not clear that we can ever 
guarantee that an agent will rationally determine that she should not want to commit a crime.  
                                                 
punishment must at least provide a base amount of deterrence (more than a $5 fine for car theft, for example) in 
order to be effective at all. 
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Indeed, it becomes an empirical claim about when punishment is the most effective deterrent 
compared to any other deterrent.  There might be more effective methods of deterring future 
crimes than punishing wrongdoers.  For example, making systemic changes to society which 
prevent the circumstances from arising that would result in those crimes being committed, might 
be a much more effective method at reducing the rate of crimes in a society than simply 
punishing everyone who commits a crime.  Any time an alternative to punishment is found to be 
more effective than the punishment, it would, in principle, undermine the justification of 
punishment for all crimes committed under those circumstances.  If the effectiveness of 
punishment as a deterrent becomes a purely empirical question, we might discover that 
punishment is never justified. 
 
4.2 Mere Means Objection 
Rawls shows that a rule utilitarian is able to argue in favour of the deterrence theory of 
punishment while taking care to show that a justification of the theory does not necessarily entail 
justifying the punishment of the innocent people, or punishment that is disproportionate to the 
crime.  He shows that a deterrence theory of punishment is only concerned with punishing 
wrongdoers because it is useful as a deterrent of crime; but that individual instances of 
punishment require additional justification beyond merely deterring.  The objection raised to this 
justification by retributivists and others, however, is that this treats wrongdoers as a means to 
accomplishing the larger goal of less crime (or whatever the goal happens to be) and neglects to 
respect the autonomy of the individual.   
The concern stems from the claim that we have a moral duty to treat others with respect.  
Retributivists assert that this is a foundational part of morality, because, if we demand moral 
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respect for ourselves (which we do when we consider ourselves moral agents), then we must also 
owe that same respect to other individuals since they are no morally different from us in any 
relevant sense.16  If an individual commits some wrong, with full knowledge of the relevant 
moral imperatives (i.e., she knows her actions were morally wrong), then the best way to respect 
her autonomy is to attribute her the moral responsibility which entails that she deserves the 
punishment for her actions.  Yet the deterrence theory of punishment is not directly concerned 
with the wrongdoer’s autonomy when justifying punishment.  It is only interested in punishing in 
order to keep society safe, and to send a message to would-be criminals so that they do not 
commit any crimes.  “Sending a message”, in this way, is using the moral agent as a tool for 
accomplishing the goal of a safer society.  This, as any good Kantian would say,17 is an 
unacceptable way of treating another person because it does not respect their autonomy. 
Since the deterrence theory does not treat persons with the moral respect that we claim 
they deserve, the mere means objection – if true – is quite damaging to the justification of the 
deterrence theory of punishment.  It means that the deterrence theory is not able to express our 
disapproval of crimes in the right way because it treats people as a mere means to an end.  
Although using the rule utilitarian justification of deterrence from Rawls ensures that 
punishments are “fair” because they do not punish too harshly or punish the innocent, there 
appears to be something profoundly lacking in punishing purely for the greater good.  That is, it 
still appears as though we are justifying a punishment merely so that the rest of us are better off 
without consideration for the autonomy of the individual.  In this way, it appears that there might 
be a distinction between doing the right thing, and doing the best thing.  Doing the best thing 
                                                 
16 The wrongdoer is morally different from an innocent individual in the sense that she has done something 
morally wrong while the innocent person has not, but not in the sense that she is any less of a moral agent 
because of her actions than anyone else.  For further discussion on this, see chapter 3.1.  
17 Kant says exactly this in The Metaphysics of Morals (1996, p. 105, 6:331 by Akademie pagination). 
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(even if it is done fairly) by producing the best outcomes, does not necessarily entail that we 
have done the right thing.  And, for this reason, we might still claim that the deterrence theory of 
punishment has not been sufficiently justified. 
 
5. Moral Education Theory  
The moral education theory is also susceptible to the mere means objection.  Since it is primarily 
concerned with punishing in order to teach the wrongdoer a moral lesson, or to express the 
wrongness of an action, it effectively uses the wrongdoer in order to accomplish this goal.  While 
that goal may be for the wrongdoer’s “own good”, it does not consult the wrongdoer on whether 
or not they want something that will allegedly help them.  Even if a punishment could help me 
better myself and society in numerous ways, I might still rationally prefer not to receive the 
punishment since it will harm me.  For example, even if punishing me by restricting my access to 
the internet would ultimately cause me to realize that stealing was wrong,18 I may still rightly 
prefer not to have my liberty restricted in this way.  In this way, the moral education theory 
disrespects the autonomy of the individual in order to produce a desired result (i.e., uses 
wrongdoers as a means to an end). 
 Aside from the mere means objection to punishment for the purpose of moral education, 
the theory can be objected to in two other ways: it is not clear that punishments will actually 
teach moral education to wrongdoers, and in relevantly similar situations we do not believe that 
it is permissible to harm someone merely because it is for her own good.   
                                                 
18 Presumably the restriction of my liberties would not itself cause the moral education, but rather the time during 
which I did not have access to the internet would allow me to reflect on the wrongness of my actions and 
therefore come to the conclusion that stealing was wrong. 
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 In order to justify the punishment of wrongdoers for the purpose of teaching them moral 
imperatives, Jean Hampton makes an analogy of punishing children in order to instruct them in 
the difference between right and wrong.  That is, a punishment is not given to exact retribution 
on a child, but in order to show her that the action was morally wrong.  And since moral 
education is generally a worthy goal, we might think that a punishment which was successful in 
accomplishing this goal might be justified.  There are, however, relevant differences between 
punishing a child for the purpose of moral education and punishing an adult for the same 
purpose.  Namely, adults often already have a sufficient understanding of the moral norms of 
their society.  It is not clear, then, that punishing them would produce the desired result of 
providing a moral education.  Furthermore, if the adult did not have the relevant moral 
knowledge of the situation, then we are more likely to say that she is not morally responsible for 
the action and does not deserve to be punished than to say that she must be punished.  For 
example, a person who drives drunk and kills a child who was playing on the side of the road 
already knew that driving drunk was immoral.  A punishment does not seem any more likely to 
teach that moral lesson than already having to live with the fact that her actions caused the 
child’s death.  Or, if she truly had been morally incompetent to the point that she acted 
innocently, it seems as though a punishment would have little hope of producing the desired 
result.  In any case, it is an empirical question whether such a punishment could hope to succeed. 
 To the second point, the moral education theory seems to recommend punishments that 
we would otherwise not think are justified.  While a punishment might be for a drunk driver’s 
own good to teach her that her actions were wrong, we might similarly force obese people to 
adopt a sustainable calorie deficit to improve their health.  Being morbidly obese, surely, is bad 
for one’s health, so forcing such an individual to diet would be better than not, since it would 
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improve the person’s life overall.  Yet there is no difference between forcing an individual to 
become more morally healthy than there is in forcing an overweight person to diet (Boonin 2008, 
191).  But we would not consider the state-sanctioned harm of an overweight person to be 
justified merely because it caused her to become healthier, so we should similarly not consider a 
moral education punishment to be justified.  In either situation, the punishment is paternalistic in 
that it does not treat the individual with the autonomy and respect that she deserves.19   
  To conclude, the moral education theory seems to have similar objections as the 
deterrence theory.  While it differs in the justification of punishment by ensuring that the 
punishment is for the individual’s own good (which prevents punishments that are intuitively too 
harsh), it similarly fails to respect the autonomy of the individual.  For this reason, it seems that 
we have strong reason to suggest that the moral education theory cannot sufficiently justify 
punishment on its own merits.  
 
6. Conclusion 
In this chapter I have discussed some of the reasons we have for thinking that the retributivist, 
deterrence, and moral education theories cannot justify punishment.  The final tally for the three 
theories is as follows.  The retributivist argument cannot be justified if we lack the moral 
responsibility required for basic desert.  If the free will sceptical position is true, then we must 
lack this moral responsibility and retributive punishment cannot be justified.  Positive retribution 
also cannot be justified (without utilizing additional justifications) if it can be shown that 
harming a wrongdoer is not always good in and of itself.  Of the three theories, retribution best 
                                                 
19 In this way, the paternalism argument is similar to the mere means objection; that is, in both cases the 
individual’s autonomy is not respected because they are merely treated as a means to an end. 
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avoids the mere means objection, although there may be some reason for thinking it can punish 
too harshly.  The deterrence theory, on the other hand, is perfectly capable of avoiding the free 
will scepticism and intrinsic goodness objections.  It is very susceptible, however, to the mere 
means objection which allows for punishments that are too harsh, punishing the innocent, and the 
paternalism objection.  Lastly, the moral education theory is also able to avoid the free will 
scepticism objection, and with some charity we can say the intrinsic goodness objection as well.  
Like the deterrence theory, though, it is susceptible to the mere means objection and seems to 
provide a paternalistic justification for punishment that we would object to under similar 
circumstances.  As we can see, then, there are strong reasons for rejecting any or all of the 
theories of punishment from chapter 1.  In the following chapter, I will introduce a fourth theory 
of punishment, the public health-quarantine model, and argue that it is not subject to any of the 
objections described here. 
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Chapter 3 
1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter I discussed three different justifications of punishment, arguing that we 
have strong reasons for concluding that none of them is able to convincingly justify punishment.  
In this chapter, I discuss a new theory of punishment, the Public Health-Quarantine (PHQ) 
model, and argue that it succeeds in justifying punishment where the others have failed.  This 
relatively recent addition to the literature on punishment is an expansion of Derk Pereboom’s 
model of punishment based on a quarantine analogy (2014) to place it “within a broader 
justificatory framework drawn from public health ethics” by Gregg Caruso (2016). 
The key focus, or the main goal, of the public health-quarantine model of punishment, as 
Caruso describes it, is to motivate or prioritize steps which prevent individuals from committing 
crimes.  That is, rather than assume society is functioning correctly and that there are some no-
good wrongdoers trying to ruin the way we all get along, it instead asserts that there are currently 
systems in society which cause or greatly influence individuals to commit crimes.  And, rather 
than blame the individuals who find themselves in circumstances where they must commit a 
crime, the PHQ model emphasizes that society should instead be working to remove those 
underlying causes.  The PHQ model, therefore, says that any justified system of punishment for 
wrongdoers must focus its efforts on the public health, whereby it promotes the rehabilitation of 
wrongdoers as well as ensuring preventative measures are taken such as education and other 
social programs that remove the underlying systemic causes of crime.   
 In the following few pages I will outline Gregg Caruso and Derk Pereboom’s arguments 
in favour of the public health-quarantine model of punishment.  To do this, I will provide a brief 
overview of an important underlying assumption of the PHQ model: that we have strong reasons 
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to believe that we lack free will in the morally relevant sense that we cannot possess ultimate 
moral responsibility for our actions.  From there, I will discuss in more detail the key aspects of 
the PHQ model of punishment, laying out its justification and inherent limitations.  Then, in 
sections 3, I will argue that that the PHQ model provides a more appealing system of punishment 
than any of the forward-, backward-, or mixed theories of punishment that I discussed in 
Chapters 1 and 2. 
 
2. Public Health-Quarantine Model of Punishment 
2.1 Free Will Scepticism 
In Chapter 2, I argued that one reason we may have for rejecting a retributivist justification of 
punishment, is that it seems as though our actions may be caused or influenced by factors outside 
of our control to such an extent as to preclude ultimate moral responsibility for our actions.  That 
is, if it is the case that our actions are determined to the extent that we cannot act of our own free 
will, then we cannot deserve blame or praise for the consequences of those actions.  And if we 
cannot deserve blame or praise for our actions, then we cannot deserve to be punished when we 
commit some morally wrong action.  It would therefore be impossible to justify punishment in 
the basic desert sense (i.e., in the way that retributivists justify punishment), since “to hold them 
responsible in a non-consequentialist desert based sense would be to hold them responsible for 
the results of the morally arbitrary, for what is ultimately beyond their control, which is 
fundamentally unfair and unjust” (Caruso 2016, 26). 
 If the free will sceptic’s position is to be accepted, a justification of punishment must not 
appeal to the notion of basic desert.  The deterrence and moral education theories succeed in this 
regard, but as I argued in Chapter 2, there are independent moral reasons for rejecting those 
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justifications.20  This seems to leave very little room for the justification of punishment.  Indeed, 
Pereboom and Caruso argue that the standard alternatives to retributivism, deterrence and moral 
education, are not appealing on these grounds (Caruso 2016, 28-29), and that if we could hope to 
justify punishing wrongdoers, it must be for different reasons than any of those discussed in 
Chapter 1.    
 Pereboom and Caruso believe that, despite these arguments against, we can hope to 
justify punishment by using a model of punishment called the Public Health-Quarantine model.  
Both Pereboom and Caruso have argued independently (Pereboom 2001; 2014, Caruso 2016; 
forthcoming) and jointly (forthcoming) that we ought to deny basic desert claims on the grounds 
that we lack moral responsibility for our actions.  They also agree, however, that it is neither 
pragmatic nor morally acceptable for the state to allow dangerous and harmful individuals to 
remain among society where they will actively make the lives of (other) innocent individuals 
unsafe.  For this reason, then, they offer a different justification of punishment based on the right 
to self-defence, which I will discuss in the proceeding section. 
 
2.2 Quarantine Model of Punishment 
As I have described, both Pereboom and Caruso assume that, no matter if determinism or 
libertarianism is true, the world does not allow for the kind of free will that is required for moral 
responsibility.  That is, they are hard incompatibilists, claiming that the stuff we normally 
associate with free will21 is incompatible with both determinism and libertarianism, and 
                                                 
20 i.e., the “using people as mere means” objection against the deterrence theory, and the argument that 
punishing criminals cannot be expected to teach moral values in the same way as punishing children for the moral 
education theory  
21 That is, we associate free will with the ability to have chosen otherwise in certain scenarios, or else to be the 
ultimate source of our actions. 
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therefore, punishment cannot be justified with an appeal to the individual’s moral responsibility 
or to basic desert claims.  Even if an individual commits a serious crime, that individual does not 
deserve to be harmed by punishment; indeed, the individual deserves to be treated in the exact 
same way as everyone else.  However, Pereboom argues that we are still justified in punishing 
those who pose a serious threat to us because we have the right to self-defence, even in cases 
where this requires harming someone else.  That is, we have the right to self-defence or the 
defense of others by threatening or harming individuals who pose a threat to us, but only in the 
minimum amount required to effectively deter the threat (Pereboom 2014, 166).  It is not 
permissible to harm individuals beyond this right to self-defence because the one causing harm 
does not deserve to be harmed in the basic desert sense.  Pereboom provides the following 
example: 
Suppose that someone clearly aims to kill you, and that to prevent his doing so 
you may knock him out with a baseball bat.  You may then threaten him with this 
amount of harm.  Suppose he does attempt to kill you, but in the process he trips 
over the toys on the floor, and this allows you to pin him to the ground and tie 
him up.  At this point is it still legitimate for you to knock him out with the bat?  
To do so would not be justified by the right to harm in self-defence. (Pereboom 
2014, 168) 
 While Pereboom’s example gives a scenario for the amount of harm that is justified in 
protecting oneself from the immediate threat of an aggressor, the same is not true for an 
individual who is already in the custody of the law (Pereboom 2014, 169).  Here, Pereboom 
argues that only incarceration of the aggressor, and no further harm, can be justified after the 
aggressor has been detained.  To show this, Pereboom draws an analogy between the right to 
self-defence and the quarantine of individuals with dangerously infectious diseases such as 
tuberculosis.  In those instances, he says, we have the right to separate those who are carrying 
communicable diseases so that they do not come into contact with others and spread the disease 
throughout a community.  Similarly, if someone poses a serious threat to society’s safety by 
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threatening to commit a murder (or other dangerous and harmful crime), then we have the right 
to incapacitate the individual such that the threat no longer exists.  The way to do this and only 
this, without causing additional harm, is to incarcerate the individual.  In this way, the least 
amount of harm is caused to the individual while still removing the possible threat to society. 
 The free will sceptic cannot, however, endorse the incarceration of anyone who commits 
non-violent or “victimless” crimes.  Since the individual does not pose a threat to the safety of 
society, it would not be justified to harm the individual.  Therefore, crimes that are currently 
punished quite harshly around the world that are not harmful to individuals, such as drug 
possession, would not merit quarantine of the individual.  At most, these sorts of crimes might 
call for monitoring, counselling, or some other form of behaviour correction that in no way takes 
away the individual’s liberties.  In this way, the quarantine model of punishment that Pereboom 
suggests would provide a proportional system of punishment where the harshest punishment that 
could be justified would be incarceration, while the weakest would be no punishment at all. 
 It is also important to note, however, that while the right to self-defence cannot justify 
harming wrongdoers more than strictly necessary, and cannot justify harming the innocent, one 
is able to provide a threat of harm in order to deter would-be wrongdoers.  For example, the state 
can explicitly state (i.e., threaten) that the punishment for bank robbery is incarceration.  In 
regards to quarantine, the “threat” from the state is also made explicit: if you contract a 
dangerously infectious disease, you will be quarantined until such a time as it can be determined 
that you are no longer a threat to society.  This threat does not apply to anyone who does not 
pose a threat of spreading the disease, but can be acted upon in order to protect the safety of 
others. 
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 The last thing I would like to discuss before I describe Caruso’s extension of the 
quarantine model of punishment to include the public health, is one seeming way in which we 
can justify punishing the innocent by using the quarantine analogy.  That is, when we suspect 
that an individual might be a carrier of an infectious disease, we still think it is justified to 
quarantine her until we can be sure that she no longer poses a threat even though she is 
effectively “innocent”.  Similarly, then, it might seem as though we could incarcerate any 
individuals who might potentially cause harm to society, even if they have not yet done so.  For 
example, if an individual were to seem exceptionally likely to commit a crime, we might think 
that it was absolutely imperative to incarcerate the individual (even if we were mistaken).  
Notably, this would seem to expose the model to serious concerns such as racial or ethnic 
discrimination, where certain people of a particular race or ethnicity are deemed to be 
threatening and are “justifiably” incarcerated, even when the threat is purely imagined due to 
racist tendencies.   
 To answer this concern, I think we can bite the bullet – albeit very softly.  First, the 
quarantine analogy does suggest that we can be justified in quarantining those who are very 
likely a threat, even if it is the case that they would not have actually caused any harm.  For 
example, an individual who speaks openly about inciting violence on a particular group of 
people could reasonably be detained even if she never intended to harm anyone.  In that case, it 
would seem reasonable and justifiable to incarcerate the individual, even if it is only for the 
purpose of establishing the individual’s intentions, mental state, etc.  If nothing else, it would 
help to make society feel more safe, knowing that a potential threat to their safety had been 
eliminated.  However – and, I think, this should be emphasized – someone who obviously 
appears to be a threat to everyone is not an edge case, and does not deal with the concern for 
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discrimination and prejudice, especially among law enforcement.  For those cases where the 
methods for predicting whether or not one is likely to be a violent criminal are objectionable (e.g. 
by racial profiling), detainment should not be justified.  Pereboom suggests that:  
To avoid this problem, it seems that invasive preventative measures should be 
restricted to those who have committed crimes.22  The right to liberty should 
count heavily here.  This right would yield strong reason not to detain someone 
even if there were some reason to believe that he is likely to commit a crime. 
(Pereboom 2001, 176-7)   
That is, and individual’s right to liberty should overrule any reason to believe an individual 
might be a threat unless that threat is immediately obvious and imminent.  In this way, reasons 
such as skin colour or choice of clothing could never pass as a legitimate justification for 
detainment of an individual who has not yet committed a crime.  This means that the analogy 
with dangerously infectious disease may not be perfect, but is still similar.  While it may be 
justifiable to issue a blanket quarantine to everyone, indiscriminately, who may have come in 
contact with an infectious disease, it would not be justifiable to quarantine everyone who has 
expressed a dissenting view, disagreeable opinion, or heard an incitation to violence.  For the 
most part, though, when quarantining people who are a risk for spreading a communicable 
disease, only individuals who pose the highest risk for carrying the disease are detained, and a 
similar (although perhaps not exactly parallel) assessment could be used for the incarceration of 
dangerous individuals. 
                                                 
22 It is not clear to me if Pereboom suggests detaining individuals at the first sign of threat if they have a past 
history of being incarcerated for committing crimes, or if he is suggesting only detaining people after they have 
attempted to cause harm (in which case I’m not sure if it could still be considered preventative).  If it is the former, 
some caution would have to be taken to ensure a criminal record did not immediately target that individual for 
being detained at the slightest provocation; while if it is the latter, then some kind of measures might have to be 
put in place so that people who are disposed to causing harm (and have a history of causing harm), could not easily 
cause harm without being stopped in some way.  The details of this have not been laid out, and additional 
discussion would likely be helpful in determining what kind of preventative measures are necessary and justifiable.  
It seems that, as a start, always erring on the side of caution (i.e., scepticism about the likelihood of harm) seems 
to be the morally correct route.   
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2.3 Public Health 
Pereboom’s view is narrowly focused on justifying criminal punishment, while Gregg Caruso 
expands this view to place it within a broader framework of public health ethics.  Like 
Pereboom, Caruso is a free will sceptic and therefore rejects retributivism and basic desert on the 
grounds that we do not have ultimate moral responsibility for our actions.  He also agrees that the 
quarantine analogy provides the best justification for incapacitation.  In order to expand on the 
quarantine model, however, Caruso argues that by placing the quarantine model in a framework 
of public health ethics, it “will not only provide a justification for the incapacitation of dangerous 
criminals but it will also provide a broader and more comprehensive approach to criminal 
behaviour generally” (Caruso 2016, 31).  That is, while the quarantine model provides us with an 
account of punishment which justifies causing the least amount of harm necessary for self-
defence, Caruso expands on this to prioritize preventative measures and provide us with “a more 
detailed set of principles for resolving the conflict between individual liberty and public safety” 
(Caruso 2016, 31). 
As well as justifying the punishment of individuals, Caruso draws from the traditional 
medical ethical approach in order to emphasize autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and 
justice (see Beauchamp and Childdress 1989).  The goal of this model is to provide a method of 
dealing with dangerous criminals which promotes the health of society as a whole (i.e., the 
public health).  Caruso describes public health as containing four unique characteristics (Caruso 
2016, 34): 
(1) It is a public or collective good; 
(2) Its promotion involves a particular focus on prevention; 
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(3) Its promotion often entails government action; and,  
(4) It involves an intrinsic outcome-orientation 
First, In regards to punishment, the public or collective good is simply ensuring that the 
goal of the criminal justice system (e.g., safety, security, justice, etc.) is maximized across the 
entire public.  The needs of the individual, then, are outweighed by the needs of society such that 
safety, security, and justice are maximized for everyone, and not just particular individuals.   
Second, A public health model of punishment would also focus on preventing crimes and 
criminal behaviour before it happens.  This is preferable to merely incarcerating individuals after 
they have committed a crime, not only because it means less crimes are being committed 
(making society safer), but also because it reduces the burden on society.  For example, less 
taxes would be required to house and feed criminals if there are fewer criminals, thus providing 
economic incentive.  The public health model therefore recommends eliminating (or alleviating) 
systemic disadvantages which are typically causes of crime.  It therefore makes the prevention of 
crime the primary concern for the criminal justice system.  Essentially, punishment (i.e., 
incarceration) is only required as a last resort when preventative measures have failed.  If, on the 
other hand, preventative measures are a success, individuals will not commit crimes because they 
have no reason to; the preventative measures would have removed systemic disadvantages, 
provided help for mental illnesses, and other underlying causes of crime such that there are no 
longer incentives, causes, or desires to commit crimes.   
The third point exists to note that those preventative measures do not yet exist; that 
governments must take action to provide the help that is required to remove the underlying issues 
which cause crimes.  And, furthermore, it must provide the help that is necessary to those who 
have committed crimes so that they are no longer a threat to society and are able to rejoin society 
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to continue their lives.  Since the quarantine model does not permit harming the individual any 
more than absolutely necessary, this also means that wrongdoers should not be treated in the way 
we treat criminals today (badly), but instead they should live as close to their regular lives as 
possible except that they are unable to physically be part of society. 
Lastly, a public health model of punishment must have a focus on considerations of 
social justice and fairness.  That is, the public health model of punishment must promote 
autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice among the public in order to ensure that the 
criminal justice system is maximizing the public health.  To do this, it must ensure the autonomy 
of the individual is infringed upon as little as possible – only when the individual poses an 
immediate threat of harm; that it benefits everyone as much as possible; that it harms individuals 
as little as possible (i.e., incapacitation is only used minimally in order to ensure the safety of 
society); and treats everyone equally and fairly. 
These sections have given a brief overview of how the public health-quarantine model 
recommends the state ought to deal with the criminal behaviour of members of society.  In the 
next sections I will discuss why the PHQ model should be preferred to the ones discussed in 
chapter 1 and 2.  Briefly, I will discuss how the PHQ model provides an alternative to 
retributivism that does not rely on basic desert, but still provides a proportional system of 
punishment similar to what the retributivist position hopes to achieve.  I will then discuss how 
Caruso’s model of punishment prevents the mere means objection that we saw in a purely 
consequentialist deterrence theory, as well as some optimism for the success of the PHQ model 
in comparison to a moral education theory.  
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3 How PHQ Improves on the Other Theories 
3.1 Retributivism 
In my discussion of free will scepticism, I noted that the PHQ model of punishment must 
necessarily deny the retributivist justification of punishment since it denies the ultimate moral 
responsibility needed for basic desert.  Any justification that hopes to succeed, then, must not 
appeal to a notion of basic desert.  Possible alternatives include the moral education theory, 
deterrence theory, the right to harm in self-defence, and an incapacitation theory (Caruso 2016, 
28).  In the following two sections I will discuss why the PHQ model of punishment (which 
justifies punishment through the right to harm in self-dense and as an incapacitation theory) 
should be preferred to both the moral education theory and deterrence theory.  For this section, 
though, I will discuss why the PHQ model is able to maintain the main appeal to the retributivist 
justification of punishment: namely, the respect for autonomy.   
The retributivist argues that the best way to respect the autonomy of individuals is to treat 
them as though they are indeed responsible for their actions.  This means that if an individual 
commits some wrong, with full knowledge of the relevant moral imperatives (i.e., she knows her 
actions were morally wrong), then the best way to respect her autonomy is to attribute her the 
moral responsibility which entails that she deserves the punishment for her actions.  The 
retributivist argues that if we want to deserve praise for our good actions, then we require moral 
responsibility in the basic desert sense, which necessarily entails that we also deserve blame for 
our bad actions. 
 By denying moral responsibility, we seemingly undermine the justification for praise or 
blame and therefore also deny the autonomy which we desire.  To a certain extent, the free will 
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sceptic must accept that autonomy in the sense described is not a priority, since it denies that 
autonomy can exist in this way.  However, the dignity of the individual can still be respected in 
much the same way.23  First, we can still have proportional punishments so that wrongdoers are 
treated more harshly for more harmful crimes, while more leniently for less harmful crimes.  
Second, we still treat individuals with respect inasmuch as they are individuals who cannot be 
used as a mere means to an end. 
 Even though the PHQ model takes a free will sceptical position on moral responsibility, it 
does not mean that individuals are merely being used as a means for deterring further crime or 
for the purpose of keeping society safe.  That is a goal of the PHQ model, but it also provides the 
guarantee that individuals are treated with respect and allowed to have as much autonomy over 
their own lives as possible (with the obvious limitation that they are not able to physically 
engage with society).  For example, the PHQ model would explicitly exclude any punishment 
which restricted the individual’s ability to pursue their own goals, such as handling their own 
finances, participating in discussions, voting, etc.  In this way, the PHQ model succeeds in 
respecting the autonomy of the individual as much as possible, while allowing for the regrettable 
but necessary infringement on their liberty to ensure the safety of society.  
The proportionality of punishments, as I discussed in the quarantine section (section 2) of 
this chapter, is also able to provide a principle of proportionality which recommends 
punishments that are proportionate to the danger being posed by the individual.  While the 
minimum punishment that could be justified might be something like a small fine for harmless 
crimes (for example, running a stop sign, or possessing a small amount of an illegal drug), the 
maximum punishment, of course, would be life imprisonment for the wrongdoer.  The way it 
                                                 
23 Caruso argues that this respects the individual’s dignity even more than the retributivist would agree to 
(forthcoming, 5-12) 
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respects the individual, however, is to ensure that the punishment is only given in the amount 
that is required to rehabilitate the individual so that recidivism did not occur.  Thus, the 
individual is shown respect by only punishing until the individual is rehabilitated, at which point 
we respect the individual enough to trust that she will be a functioning member of society.  For 
example, Caruso (forthcoming, 12) provides a possible scenario: 
 Consider again the hypothetical scenario used in the Shariff et al. study.  The 
fictional case involved an offender who beat a man to death but after serving two 
years in prison was nearly 100% effectively rehabilitated.  The case further 
stipulated that “the prosecution and defense had agreed that the rehabilitation 
would prevent recidivism and that any further detention after rehabilitation would 
offer no additional deterrence of other potential criminals” (Shariff et al. 2014, 4).  
On [the public health-quarantine] model, it would be unjust to continue to 
incapacitate this individual. 
 In this scenario, the PHQ model maintains that individuals who no longer pose a threat to 
society should not be incarcerated.  This treatment of the individual greatly respects her dignity 
by showing that the state trusts her to be a functioning member of society.  In this way, while it is 
not the case that she is punished in the amount deserved, but exactly in the amount that her 
dignity demands by allowing her to rejoin society once she no longer poses a threat of harm to 
others.  Therefore, the PHQ model is still able to provide a “deserved” punishment, although not 
in the basic desert sense. 
 
3.2 Consequentialism / Deterrence Theories of Punishment 
The issues for the deterrence theory of punishment that I discussed in chapter 2 were these: 
deterrence may not be effective in certain circumstances, especially when people are less likely 
to rationally weigh the consequences of their actions; deterrence can, in principle, justify 
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punishing the innocent or punishing unfairly;24 and using people as mere means to an end 
without respect for their autonomy.  In my discussion of the public health-quarantine model of 
punishment above, I hinted at the way in which it can avoid these issues.  In this section, 
however, I will provide a more detailed account of the issues and how the PHQ model is 
preferable to the deterrence theory. 
One clear difference between the PHQ model and the deterrence theory, is that 
punishment is not justified solely on the basis of whether it deters future crimes.  While the 
primary goal of the criminal justice system is to prevent future crimes, the actual punishment of 
individuals is not because it provides a tangible threat to others who are considering committing 
a crime; instead, its purpose is to ensure the safety of society.  The punishment may deter future 
crimes because of the threat of incarceration, but it is not the primary goal of punishment, nor 
what provides its justification.  In this way, then, one of the concerns for the deterrence theory is 
overcome by the PHQ model.  While we may have legitimate concerns for the efficacy of using 
punishment as a deterrent (e.g., when individuals commit crimes of passion), the PHQ model is 
not concerned with when the punishment is an effective deterrent – it is primarily concerned with 
removing the threat to individual’s safety.  If, in a fit of rage or passion, an individual attacked 
someone, the correct response would always be to remove the threat from society, without any 
regard to whether or not that would effectively reduce future crime. 
In my discussion of the quarantine model above, I briefly discussed how the use of 
punishment cannot be justified when it is in excess (i.e., goes beyond incapacitation) or used 
against the innocent in order to deter.  That discussion is directly related to this concern for the 
deterrence theory where it seems as though, in order to deter most effectively, we might be 
                                                 
24 i.e., punishing some criminals more than others simply to make an example of them in order to deter future 
crimes. 
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justified in punishing the innocent or punishing harshly so that others are aware of the negative 
consequences for committing a crime.  In the PHQ model, however, there are very strict upper 
bounds for the amount of punishment that can be justified: only as much as necessary to remove 
an immediate threat to society.  This means that, while the death penalty is obviously effective at 
removing a threat to society, it cannot be justified because it does not follow the principle of least 
infringement.  Instead, after the aggressor has been detained, the threat has been removed as long 
as the individual is no longer able to cause further harm to society.   
It might be the case that the only way to stop an immediate threat to someone’s life is to 
take lethal force, so the PHQ model is able to justify a use of force in this way, but after the treat 
has been neutralized by whatever means are necessary at the time, then no further punishment 
can be justified.  As I discussed in the example above, if it is possible to remove a threat of harm 
by tying someone up, then after this has been done it can no longer be justified to beat that 
person with a baseball bat.  In this way, the worry for the deterrence theory that excessive force 
can be justified does not exist with the PHQ model since only the minimum amount of harm is 
ever allowed in order to ensure the safety of society.  While the deterrence theory deters 
wrongdoers by any means necessary including the use of force to intimidate, the PHQ model can 
only use the threat of incapacitation as a deterrent from committing the crime.  The actual harm 
itself cannot be justified unless it is preventing further harm, and since the effectiveness of the 
harm as a deterrent does not play into it its justification, it can never be used excessively or on 
the innocent. 
Lastly, the PHQ model provides a way to address the “mere means” objection that 
retributivists argue makes the consequentialist deterrence theory unjustified.  That is, the 
deterrence theory of punishment sometimes justifies harming individuals merely as a means to 
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deterring others or “to provide credibility for a system of threats” (Pereboom 2014, 169).  The 
retributivist claims that “using” people in this fashion is unjustified because it does not respect 
the autonomy of the individual.  That is, since people are not merely objects to be used as tools 
for keeping society safe, then we should respect the principle of autonomy25 and not treat them 
as such.   
Two things can be said about the principle of autonomy in regards to the PHQ model of 
punishment.  First, that the principle is not the primary concern and is therefore sometimes 
infringed upon, but second, that considerable weight is given to the principle of autonomy so that 
it is infringed upon as little as possible and only when it can be justified by a more general 
principle of justice that we think to be true.  To the first point, it is obviously the case that there 
are regrettable circumstances where the state is forced to infringe on an individual’s right to 
freedom and liberty in order to protect the safety of society.  For example, a serial killer who 
outspokenly plans to kill again should not be allowed to remain at liberty to do so by the state.  
In this sense, the PHQ model allows for the infringement of the individual’s autonomy, however, 
it only does so in the interest of others, and only when the threat to others’ safety is serious 
enough to warrant it.  It would not, for example, be justified in incarcerating individuals who 
commit victimless or harmless crimes such as running a stop sign when there are no other cars 
on the road.  In situations where there is no threat to anyone’s safety, “punishments” that did not 
infringe on the individual’s autonomy would be more appropriate, for example, a small fine or 
other non-invasive punishment.  In that way, the individual’s autonomy is respected as much as 
possible, whenever possible, provided that individuals’ autonomy does not threaten the 
                                                 
25 As Caruso describes the principle of autonomy in terms of public health ethics: “places primary emphasis on the 
liberty, privacy, and informed consent of individual persons in the face of a health intervention carried out by other 
parties.  It acknowledges a person’s right to make choices, to hold views, and to take actions based on personal 
beliefs” (Caruso 2016, 37). 
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wellbeing of anyone else.  In chapter 4, I further discuss the requirements for respecting the 
individual’s autonomy and how the PHQ model can ensure that it is infringing upon it as little as 
possible. 
 
3.3 Moral Education Theories of Punishment 
In chapter 1 I explained that the moral education theory of punishment justifies causing harm to 
individuals based on an analogy of punishing children.  That is, we do not punish children in 
order to give them what they deserve, but instead to teach them a moral lesson.  For example, we 
may censure a child’s behaviour when she steals from a sibling in order to show her that such 
behaviour is morally wrong.  Since this justification of punishment does not rely on the moral 
responsibility or the basic desert of the wrongdoer, a free will sceptic may potentially be able to 
accept this justification (Caruso 2016, 28).  As I discussed in chapter 2, however, it is not clear 
that punishment is as effective at teaching morals to adults as it is to children.  For this reason, 
there appears to be empirical concerns for the justification of punishment in the moral education 
theory. 
 The PHQ model of punishment does not justify punishment only if it is able to teach 
moral knowledge to the wrongdoer – it is only justified when it minimally harms an individual to 
ensure the safety of society – so, in that case this worry is not a concern for Caruso and 
Pereboom’s justification of punishment.  Taken more broadly, however, is the more general 
concern that the PHQ model of punishment can be reasonably expected to actually succeed in 
providing preventative measures, preventing harm to society, and rehabilitating individuals 
effectively without harming them more than necessary.   
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The success of the PHQ model, of course, relies heavily on the structure of the criminal 
justice system under a well-justified theory.  The benefit of this model over other theories 
(including the moral education theory) is that it prioritizes the preventative measures to reduce 
crime before they occur, rather than merely waiting for individuals to commit crime and then 
punishing them harshly.  Caruso provides the following comparison of the PHQ model of 
punishment with public health ethics:  
The primary function of [public health] agencies is to prevent disease, food borne 
illnesses, environmental destruction, injuries, and the like.  A non-retributivist 
approach to criminal justice modeled on public health ethics would similarly 
focus on prevention … Instead of focusing on punishing criminals and building 
more supermax prisons, the public health model would advocate addressing the 
systemic causes of crime, such as social injustice, poverty, systemic disadvantage, 
mental health issues, and addiction. (Caruso 2016, 33-34) 
While the moral education theory asserts that punishment can be justified when it 
teaches moral behaviour, the PHQ model judges success on crime rate and recidivism 
rate.  So, while the analogy between punishing children and punishing adults seems to 
fall apart in theory (as discussed in Chapter 2), the PHQ model can succeed in theory and 
merely requires a correctly structured and focused criminal justice system in order to 
succeed in practice.  There is good reason to believe, therefore, that the PHQ model is 
capable of providing a theory of punishment that is both justified and likely to work in 
practice.  In the next chapter, I will discuss further reasons to believe the PHQ model will 
succeed in practice, where I provide several examples to help showcase this. 
 
4. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have introduced the public health-quarantine model as an alternative to the 
theories that were discussed in chapter 1 and 2.  I have shown that the PHQ model is able to 
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justify the punishment of harmful and dangerous individuals when it is for the explicit purpose of 
protecting society, and only by causing the least harm necessary in order to achieve that goal.  I 
argued that, by justifying punishment only under those specific conditions, it avoids worries 
about unjustly harming innocent people or excessively harming certain wrongdoers.  It also 
provides us with a reasonable expectation of ensuring the safety of society, while respecting the 
autonomy of individuals and providing proportional punishments.  In the next chapter I will 
further argue that the PHQ model is able to provide an appealing response to the “mere means” 
objection.  I will also show that the PHQ model ought to be interpreted in a way that takes the 
health of the wrongdoer seriously, and that there exists a moral obligation for the state to 
compensate wrongdoers for unfairly incarcerating them.  I will argue that this obligation can be 
met and I will provide several suggestions for how this can be done while showing that the 
obligation does not make incarceration so lenient as to be inviting. 
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Chapter 4 
1. Introduction 
In chapter 3, I outlined Gregg Caruso’s free will sceptical model of punishment based on Derk 
Pereboom’s quarantine analogy within a broader justificatory framework of public health ethics 
(Caruso 2016, 25).  He defends a view of punishment from a position of free will scepticism; 
denying that we have ultimate moral responsibility for our actions and therefore cannot justify 
punishment from basic desert.26  Instead, Caruso proposes a model of punishment which focuses 
on the public health, while still being justifiable (i.e., does not punish too harshly or in another 
way that cannot be morally justified).  To do this, Caruso provides a model of punishment which 
justifies removing dangerous and harmful individuals from a society for the overall benefit of 
that society.  This model of punishment focuses on an overall, public health, while taking care to 
consider that individuals do not have ultimate moral responsibility for their actions. 
 I have argued that the public health-quarantine model of punishment gives us the best 
justification of punishment so far; or at least that it is preferable to the alternatives I discussed in 
Chapter 1.  For that reason, the aim of this chapter is not to criticize the PHQ model of 
punishment, but instead to explain and clarify the obligation that exists to improving the 
wrongdoer’s health in order to justify a punishment in the PHQ model.  The way Caruso has 
currently presented the PHQ model of punishment, the primary concern may be seen to be the 
public or collective good at the regrettable but necessary expense of the individual wrongdoer.  
This interpretation of the model would open it to the “mere means” objection raised against the 
deterrence theory in chapter 2 in which individuals are treated as a means to an end instead of 
                                                 
26 As Pereboom describes basic desert: “the agent would deserve to be blamed or praised just because she has 
performed the action, given an understanding of its moral status, and not, for example, merely by virtue of 
consequentialist or contractualist considerations” (Pereboom 2014, 2). 
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respecting their individual autonomy.  I believe that such an interpretation of the model would be 
incorrect; rather that an individual’s rights must be weighed heavily when she does not hold 
moral responsibility for her actions.27  It is the aim of this chapter, then, to argue that there exists 
a moral obligation such that any state-sanctioned punishment must also compensate a wrongdoer 
by improving her circumstances after the period of incarceration.28 
In order to show why Caruso’s PHQ model ought to be interpreted in the way I am 
proposing, I will first provide a brief review of the PHQ model.  Then, I will show that Saul 
Smilansky’s objection (Smilansky 2011; 2016) to Derk Pereboom’s quarantine analogy produces 
a tricky problem for the PHQ model of punishment that, I think, has not sufficiently been met by 
either Pereboom or Caruso.29  I will argue that this problem can be met by interpreting Caruso’s 
model in the way I have proposed above.  More specifically, I will argue that Smilansky 
correctly points out that we owe a wrongdoer compensation for her incarceration, and that this 
compensation can be achieved with special attention to that individual’s health.  Following this, I 
will show that compensating wrongdoers in this way does not provide us reason to believe that 
any justifiable punishment must necessarily result in luxurious accommodations for a wrongdoer 
such that there is an incentive to commit crime, rather than refrain from it.  To conclude, I will 
argue that the PHQ model is able to respond to the “mere means” objection by providing a focus 
                                                 
27 Caruso’s model takes as a starting point the assumption that we cannot assume an individual has free will in any 
meaningful sense, which ultimately results in the individual losing moral responsibility for her actions (Caruso 
2016, 25-28). 
28 Here I say “improving her circumstances,” but do not mean to imply just any sort of compensation will suffice.  I 
might replace “circumstances” with “public health,” except that this seems to conflate the public health of society 
as a whole with the health of the individual within that society, as a functioning member of that society.  In any 
case, I go into more detail about what exactly is owed to a wrongdoer later in the chapter, so if the term seems 
slightly confusing now, it should become more clear shortly. 
29 Although both have provided responses (see: Pereboom 2014; Caruso, forthcoming) 
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on the health of the individual such that wrongdoers are not merely being treated as an object for 
improving overall public health, but also as autonomous individuals. 
 
2. Overview of the Public Health-Quarantine Model 
The Public Health-Quarantine model ensures that quarantine is only used minimally, in a way 
that is least harmful to the individual while still guaranteeing the safety of the public.  At the 
same time, additional focus is placed on the prevention of future crimes; ensuring society is 
educated and aware of laws and moral norms, and removing or preventing social barriers and 
circumstances which conspire to place people into situations where their only option is to 
commit a crime.  This focus places considerable attention on the needs of society.  As Caruso 
puts it, public health is a “public or collective good” (Caruso 2016, 33).  To a certain extent, this 
means that the needs of society trumps the needs of the individual (for example, when an 
individual is too dangerous to remain free in society because they will cause grievous harm to 
others).   
The individual, however, never deserves this treatment in the basic desert sense.  It must 
be made clear, then, that this cannot be pressed to extremes: it cannot be acceptable to take away 
an individual’s liberty merely because that is what is best for society; it should not be acceptable, 
for example, to simply kill all wrongdoers, even if it would maximally alleviate the burden of 
wrongdoers from society (since, for example, it is no longer necessary to feed, educate, or 
rehabilitate a wrongdoer at the cost of tax dollars and economic resources).  To ensure that this 
does not happen, it must be made clear that this is a morally unacceptable way to deal with 
wrongdoers.  In the following few pages I will argue that it is possible to justifiably quarantine 
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wrongdoers in a way that respects the individual’s autonomy while also taking seriously the need 
for health and rehabilitation of the wrongdoer. 
 
3. Obligation for Wrongdoers Who Are Incarcerated/Quarantined 
Caruso goes to some lengths to ensure that the quarantine and rehabilitation process of 
wrongdoers is only as harmful as strictly necessary to ensure the safety of society, and describes 
his position such that it weighs the principle of autonomy carefully against society’s need to 
restrict the wrongdoer’s liberty for its own safety (Caruso forthcoming, 10).  All of this works to 
define the boundaries and limitations to the PHQ model so that whatever course of action is 
taken can be justified.  However, it does not go very far toward explaining what moral 
obligations we have to the wrongdoer.  That is, Caruso has spent a good deal of time describing 
what we are not allowed to do to the wrongdoer, but has not described what we must do for the 
wrongdoer.  This latter part will be the focus of this section. 
 Given the distinct lack of basic desert from the free will sceptic’s position, Saul 
Smilansky rightly points out an objection to the PHQ model in the following way.  An individual 
ought to be treated by the state as innocent (since individuals cannot be morally responsible in 
the basic desert sense, they must be treated equally regardless of their actions).  However, since 
the state treats some people substantively worse than others by quarantining those that it deems a 
threat to the safety of society, the state “needs to offer such compensation as will right the 
balance” (Smilansky 2016, 11).  I think that this needs to be taken very seriously and cannot 
simply be dismissed by supposing that the actions of the state are justified for the “greater good” 
of society (i.e., for purely utilitarian concerns). 
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 Smilansky objects to the PHQ model of punishment, suggesting that since the state harms 
wrongdoers by quarantining them, any compensation that would balance the harm caused to 
them would necessarily make the quarantine so attractive that prison would look more like a 
five-star hotel than a correction facility (Smilansky 2011, 173).  This, he believes, results in 
“funishment,” where individuals are better off in prison than they ever could be in their daily 
lives, resulting in an incentive to commit crime rather than punishment being a deterrent for 
crime.  Rather than create a method for rehabilitating wrongdoers, the kind of compensation that 
would be necessary for unfairly incarcerating an individual who is not morally responsible for 
her actions would likely result in an increase in crime, as many would choose the luxurious 
accommodation the state would be required to provide for merely taking away one’s freedom.  
Smilansky’s claim, then, is that the obligation that is owed to individuals for unfairly harming 
them is so high that a punishment is not “punishment” at all, but instead something resembling 
an all-inclusive vacation. 
I think that Smilansky is correct in asserting that any individual whose liberty is limited 
by quarantine must be compensated, but I think that there are alternatives to fulfilling the state’s 
obligation to compensate those it harms, while also avoiding the concerns of funishment.  
Namely, a simple improvement to the individual’s conditions before she was incarcerated would 
go a long way to providing a necessary and sufficient compensation for the infringement of 
liberty.  This could be done in two parts: first, while being quarantined, ensuring that every effort 
is being taken to “heal” the wrongdoer, and second, enabling the individual to have a better life 
after being rehabilitated than they had before, without being required to make prison into a 5-star 
resort.  I will briefly describe each of those in more detail before discussing why we should be 
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satisfied with these two recommendations for fulfilling our obligation to compensate the 
individuals. 
 As we have seen, the quarantine model of punishment draws on the analogy of the 
necessity for quarantining those with dangerously infectious diseases, such as Tuberculosis.  We 
do not, however, think that we have achieved justice and fulfilled our obligation to society after 
successfully isolating the infectious person from society.  Society as a whole might be safe, but 
we also feel that we owe this person every reasonable effort to cure their infectious disease so 
that they can rejoin society; that is, we do not think that we can be morally justified in merely 
protecting society from a threat; we are also morally obligated to provide the individual with 
quick and effective health care.  This too serves to promote the public health: alleviating the 
burden to medical caregivers and adding a functioning member into society.  Similarly, I think, 
we have a moral obligation to “heal” or “cure” a wrongdoer when they are not guilty in the basic 
desert sense; and, since the PHQ model denies basic desert, individuals are never guilty in this 
sense and the state always has this moral obligation.  While the state has a moral obligation to 
society to keep the individual quarantined while they pose a risk, it also has a moral obligation to 
individuals to ensure that they are only a risk for the minimum possible amount of time, and that 
they are only quarantined for just as long as – and no longer than – they are a threat to others’ 
wellbeing. 
 To show that this analogy holds for the obligation to help those with infectious diseases 
as well as to help those who are a harm to society through their actions, let me first discuss how 
luck plays a significant role in which actions are available to us, and how this often causes us to 
not be guilty in the basic desert sense.  This is because we are not responsible for our actions in 
the relevant and important way that we could have done otherwise, or that we are the ultimate 
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source of our actions.  For example, we would not blame an individual who became paralyzed 
after being pushed down some stairs for not being able to run a marathon in under four hours; it 
would be ridiculous to expect such a thing to be within her abilities.  No amount of resolve or 
strength of will could cause running a marathon to be within her abilities and she could not 
simply choose to run the marathon instead of remaining paralyzed.  Similarly, we do not blame a 
child who is born into poverty or praise one who is born into wealth.  It is completely out of their 
control which family they are born into, yet it plays an enormous role in the opportunities 
available to the individual throughout her life.30  These kinds of unfair advantages and 
disadvantages seem unjust to many egalitarians which motivates and justifies redistributive 
policies which aim to negate these inequalities in one’s life. 
 The circumstances which caused the individuals in those two examples to be able to act 
only in certain ways is not because of their willful refusal to act otherwise, it is simply the result 
of bad brute luck.  Ronald Dworkin describes brute luck as being different from option luck in 
the following way: “Option luck is a matter of how deliberate and calculated gambles turn out – 
whether someone games or loses through accepting an isolated risk he or she should have 
anticipated and might have declined… [whereas brute luck is] a matter of how risks fall out that 
are not in that sense deliberate gambles” (Dworkin 2000, 73).  That is, when situations arise 
purely out of events that are beyond one’s control (such as an accident which requires one’s legs 
to be amputated, or having abusive parents, etc.), then that is the result of brute luck – and, when 
those circumstances result in a disadvantageous situation for the individual, then it is a case of 
bad brute luck.   
                                                 
30For example, the richest 1 percent of men live an average of 14.6 years longer than the poorest 1 percent in the 
US. (Stepner, M. et al. 2016. The Association Between Income and Life Expectancy in the United States, 2001-2014 
JAMA. 2016;315(16):1750-1766. doi:10.1001/jama.2016.4226) 
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 There are two things to be said about brute luck, and one thing to be said about the free 
will sceptic’s position on brute luck: first, it is inherently “unfair” when an individual is subject 
to either bad brute luck or good brute luck since they have done nothing to deserve their 
circumstances; second, that a fair society ought to try to compensate for bad brute luck; and 
third, that the free will sceptic will deny option luck entirely and say that every circumstance is 
the result of brute luck.  Once I have explained these in a little more detail, it will be clear why 
the analogy between dangerously infectious individuals and dangerous criminals holds true. 
  First, the individuals did nothing to deserve the unlucky events which resulted in their 
unfortunate inability to act in certain ways; the paraplegic did not ask to be pushed down some 
stairs,31 just as the child did not ask to be born into a family of negligent parents.  In no way, 
then, is it their fault that they find themselves in those situations and unable to act in certain 
ways.  That being the case, it is unfair that their circumstances have limited them in certain ways 
while other individuals have been fortunate enough not to be limited in the same ways: most 
people have not been involved in a horrific accident which left them paralyzed, and certainly 
some children are born into affluent families with loving, attentive parents that afforded their 
child with every opportunity.  Because of this, all instances of brute luck are inherently unfair 
since there is nothing anyone can do to change whether they are the recipient of either good or 
bad brute luck; that is, brute luck is entirely outside of the control of the individual. 
 Since brute luck cannot be influenced by one’s choices, “most egalitarians believe that 
justice requires the nullification of all differential effects of brute luck … feeling that it cannot be 
just that some people are worse off than others simply because they have been unfortunate, say, 
                                                 
31 For the sake of the argument, assume the individual did not want to become a paraplegic and did not take 
actions which would knowingly result in that outcome. 
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to have been born with bad genes” (Lippert-Rasmussen 2014).32  In terms of distributive justice, 
it is important that everyone is placed on roughly equal footing in order to have a fair chance at 
succeeding in one’s pursuit of the good life.33  Therefore, it is necessary to eliminate the effects 
of bad brute luck so that no one is disadvantaged to the point where they are unable to pursue 
their conception of the good life as effectively as anyone else. 
An important aspect of the luck egalitarian position is that we should compensate for bad 
brute luck, but that we are still responsible for our own option luck (the calculated risks and 
gambles that we knowingly take in our lives).  For example, the luck egalitarian may argue that 
we are responsible when we buy a lottery ticket and knowingly accept the risk of losing the 
amount spent on the ticket for the exceedingly small chance of winning the jackpot.  In this case, 
there is no obligation to nullify the bad option luck when we inevitably do not win the jackpot 
because it was not the result of bad brute luck that we were disadvantaged.  However, while 
distributive justice does not require compensation for bad option luck, the pervasiveness of brute 
luck makes it so that even when there exists some option luck in a decision, there is always some 
underlying brute luck which has an influence on the decisions being made or the gambles being 
taken. 
The free will sceptic argues that all instances of an individual acting are instances that are 
ultimately caused by brute luck.34  By denying free will (or assuming that it cannot exist), there 
can be no point in time where an individual makes a decision that is not the result of factors 
outside of one’s control, which undermines one’s ultimate moral responsibility for the action.  
                                                 
32 For examples of egalitarians who believe this, see Cohen (2011, 5, 29); Dworkin (2000); Rakowski (1991); for a 
recent critique, see Elford (2013). 
33 That is, people are able to pursue their conception of the good life, whatever it may be, on equal footing as 
everyone else. 
34 Neil Levy (2011) employs an argument to this effect which describes the pervasiveness of luck as ultimately 
undermining free will entirely.   
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Even if it is not the case that the pervasiveness of brute luck completely undermines free will, 
however, we can still see that the existence of brute luck causes the PHQ model to have an 
obligation to nullify the bad brute luck that results in individuals being incarcerated.  Take, for 
example, an individual with exceptionally bad constitutive luck (i.e., the bad luck involved with 
having bad personality traits).  Through no fault of her own (perhaps as a result of growing up in 
an underprivileged family), the individual is more likely to cause harm than other people.  If that 
person then commits a crime, it is in large part due to her bad constitutive luck.  She was only in 
the situation in which she was more likely to commit the crime than other people would have 
been. 
Take a more concrete example: the Nazi prison guard at a concentration camp.  All things 
being considered, it is exceptionally unlucky that had been alive in Nazi Germany and 
indoctrinated with Nazi rhetoric and ideals.  Even more unlucky, she was in a situation where 
someone was able to choose her, out of all possible candidates, to be a guard in a concentration 
camp where she was part of unspeakably horrible crimes.  Today, we are lucky enough not to 
Nazi prison guard job positions, so no amount of bad brute luck could place us in that position.  
However, had we gone through the same experiences as the Nazi prison guard, it is entirely 
possible that we would have committed the same crimes as her. 
This bad brute luck in the form of bad constitutive and circumstantial luck largely 
outweighs the option luck that is present in the Nazi guard case.  Although she may have been 
able to weigh the risks of being hired by the Nazis and required to morally atrocious acts, it is 
largely due to factors outside of her control that she was able and willing to do those things in the 
first place.  The same can be said of any wrongdoer; while we are lucky enough not to be 
disposed to commit wrongs, or to find ourselves in situations where we are able commit serious 
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crimes, wrongdoers are placed in those situations.  Because of this they cannot hold ultimate 
moral responsibility for their actions.  Thus, when a wrongdoer commits a crime, she cannot be 
held morally responsible for her actions and therefore cannot deserve to be incarcerated in the 
basic desert sense.  This suggests that when an individual is incarcerated, the state owes her some 
form of compensation for treating her in a way that she does not morally deserve. 
 After describing the inescapable amount of brute luck that exists in influencing an 
individual’s actions, it should become clear how the PHQ model of punishment requires 
compensation for the incarceration of dangerous criminals.  Since it is a matter of bad brute luck 
that the state is required to incarcerate or quarantine a dangerous individual for the safety of 
society, it therefore has an obligation to nullify this bad brute luck by way of compensation.  
That is, when individuals are not ultimately responsible for their actions, the PHQ model must 
offer some compensation for treating some individuals considerably worse than others in order to 
justify the incarceration of those individuals.  In relation to the analogy of our obligation to those 
with infectious diseases, just as we can only fully35 justify quarantining individuals with 
infectious diseases by curing them, we must provide every reasonable effort in helping the 
wrongdoer as well.  Thus, we also have an obligation to compensate wrongdoers for unfairly 
harming them by way of incarceration.  In the next section, I will discuss how the obligation for 
compensating individuals can be fulfilled. 
  
                                                 
35 Part of the justification comes from the right to harm in self-defense, while the remainder must come from the 
nullification of the bad brute luck which caused them to be in that situation to begin with. 
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4. Two Ways to Fulfil the Moral Obligation of Compensation 
Fulfilling this moral obligation is certainly not a simple matter.  It is also important to stress that 
this should not leave room to neglect the autonomy of wrongdoers on the grounds that it is for 
their own good.  The harm principle should still hold weight, so it would not be acceptable to 
attempt to use methods of rehabilitation that undermined the individual’s autonomy.  For 
example, it is possible that we might be able to prevent all wrongdoers or would-be wrongdoers 
from committing another crime by forcing them to undergo lobotomies or electro-shock therapy 
or some other ridiculous “treatment.” Those, of course, would clearly be unacceptable under 
both the harm principle and the principle of least infringement, given that those means are more 
harmful than necessary and clearly do not respect the autonomy of the individual.  Balancing the 
principle of least infringement and the harm principle would allow for the detention or 
incarceration of harmful and dangerous individuals, but it would not permit the sorts of 
punishment that exist in North America today: the duration of sentences and the living conditions 
that are routinely prescribed to nonviolent criminals are certainly more harmful than strictly 
necessary to ensure public safety. 
 On the other hand, methods that can be used must prioritize the principle of autonomy.  
That is, it must place “primary emphasis on the liberty, privacy, and informed consent of 
individual persons in the face of a health intervention carried out by other parties” (Caruso 2016, 
37).  The methods employed, then, would always be with the consent and willing participation of 
those being rehabilitated.  The methods themselves would, presumably, include whatever 
rehabilitation techniques are supported by trained professionals whose goal it is to successfully 
rehabilitate wrongdoers into society.  I will not try to give an exhaustive list of methods, not least 
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of all because I am not a trained professional in the area, but also because any list that I might 
provide would be subject to current scientific information that might become outdated or 
ineffectual in different contexts.  It is not the goal of this chapter to provide a method of 
rehabilitation, but instead only to express the limitations of what sorts of rehabilitation can justly 
be provided.  The sorts of rehabilitation methods that I have in mind, however, might include 
therapy or jobs meant to expose wrongdoers to ways in which they can meaningfully contribute 
to society. 
 The second method of compensation for quarantine is closely related to the first, and can 
be supported by what has already been said about the PHQ model.  That is, since I think we are 
morally required to compensate an innocent (in the basic desert sense) individual for unfairly but 
justifiably limiting their liberty, I will argue that it would be reasonable to provide compensation 
in the form of better opportunities in life after enduring quarantine than were available to that 
individual before.  This does not mean that individuals are paid handsomely for committing a 
crime, nor any other form of compensation that incentivizes committing a crime.  Rather, it 
should incentivize individuals to want to be a part of the rehabilitation process, thereby making 
society better off overall, and fulfilling the moral obligations of the government for quarantining 
an individual who does not deserve to be quarantined. 
 I think there are three key areas in which rehabilitators can make a wrongdoer “better 
off” than when they had committed the crime in the first place.  Providing education, 
work/employment opportunities or other programs that contribute to society, and preventing and 
eliminating contributing factors that led the individual to act wrongly are all areas that can make 
the individual better off, while also providing compensation for their undeserved quarantine.  
The specifics of these will probably depend on the severity of the punishment, and it may be the 
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case that the rehabilitation process could provide the morally required compensation for 
individuals.  I will discuss the specifics of these types of compensation when I argue that these 
types of compensation are sufficient to fulfil our moral obligation. 
There are two problems for the sort of compensation I am suggesting that must be 
overcome.  First, why is this compensation sufficient to nullify the harm caused by incarcerating 
an individual who is not guilty in the basic desert sense?  Second, how can we ensure the 
compensation does not act as an incentive to commit further crime?  The first is a moral 
question, so we will need to determine what moral obligation is owed and how much; while the 
second is an empirical question that may simply require empirical data before it can be 
determined to actually succeed.  For the former, I will argue that this compensation is morally 
sufficient, and for the latter, I will provide several empirical examples to suggest that this does 
not produce the latter problem. 
 Although we can morally justify the incarceration of harmful wrongdoers with the PHQ 
model, we still have a moral obligation to nullify or compensate their unfortunate circumstances 
since their circumstances are the result of bad brute luck.  One method of doing so is to provide 
equality in initial prospects, such that the effects of bad brute luck do not place an individual at 
serious disadvantage for succeeding in society (Vallentyne 2002, 543).36  Currently, for example, 
individuals who are convicted of a crime are routinely marked as criminals by society (or 
labelled with criminal records that must be disclosed), drastically disadvantaging those 
individuals in their ability to succeed in society.  For example, individuals with a criminal record 
have much more difficulty finding a job or housing; in some cases, they lose the right to vote.  If 
                                                 
36 Vallentyne provides an argument against the nullification of bad brute luck, but requires equality in initial 
prospects.  I think this distinction disappears, however, since it seems as though “equality in initial prospects” just 
means pre-morally responsible actions, and when moral responsibility is denied, all points in time are pre-moral 
responsibility. 
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instead, the rehabilitation process was to include removing previously existing systemic or 
personal disadvantages for the individual to succeed, this would be one way of negating the bad 
brute luck that caused the individual to be incarcerated in the first place. 
In this regard, the rehabilitation provided during incarceration would certainly go a long 
way towards making individuals better off than they were before: for one thing, by being 
properly rehabilitated they are no longer going to be a threat to society.  In a very trivial sense, 
that will make them better off than they were before, merely in virtue of the fact that they no 
longer risk being incarcerated.  This alone may be enough to compensate certain individuals, if 
the harm caused by the state is very minimal and rehabilitation could occur relatively swiftly.   
 On the other hand, different cases may require different levels of compensation.  For 
instance, especially lengthy periods of incarceration, or cases where there were pre-existing 
grievous inequalities that led to the wrongdoer being incarcerated, may require additional 
compensation.  It may be the case that the rehabilitation process would necessarily always 
provide enough compensation to cancel the negative effects of incarceration; if the process is 
carried out in such a way as to always make the individual better off by the correct amount.  
Caruso has already provided some arguments for the proportionality of the punishment, arguing 
that the PHQ model, although denying moral responsibility, is able to recommend harsher (i.e., 
longer) or softer (i.e., something like close monitoring instead of incapacitation) punishments 
depending on the danger that the individual poses to society (Caruso 2016, 40).  Similarly, these 
punishments would require more or less compensation depending on the type of punishment.  An 
especially long punishment, then, might require that the rehabilitation process ensures that efforts 
be taken to reduce or eliminate the underlying systemic problems which led to the wrongdoing in 
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the first place, while certain smaller crimes may simply involve a brief one-on-one therapy 
session with the wrongdoer (for example).    
 
5. Guarding Against Funishment 
Saul Smilansky has proposed a potentially powerful objection against approaches to punishment 
such as the PHQ model.  Smilansky argues that we have a moral obligation to compensate 
individuals for harming them since they do not deserve to be harmed.  He believes this obligation 
would necessarily require us to compensate offenders who are quarantined to such a degree that 
our prisons “would need to resemble five-star hotels” (Smilansky 2016, 3), thereby incentivising 
crime since the living conditions of being incarcerated would be so preferable to the regular 
struggles of society.  According to the so-called funishment objection, any approach to 
punishment that aimed to compensate the punished would be self-defeating, since it would have 
the effect of incentivizing crime.  In other words, if the PHQ included fair compensation, it 
would not achieve the aim of promoting public health, since it would increase crime.  And while 
we may reasonably say that the PHQ model of punishment has other methods of providing 
compensation to wrongdoers that does not resemble a five-star hotel, provided it takes seriously 
the health of the individual; it has not been shown that these efforts at rehabilitation will not be 
so convenient and luxurious, that it would inadvertently act as an incentive to commit crime.   
 Let me first address a worry that, in any given society, the least well-off in society would 
happily give up their liberty in order to secure room and board in a rehabilitative prison.  I can 
conceivably think of a society in which this is the case.  Indeed, there are certainly some 
countries today where, if they implemented an ideal punishment system, it would be more 
appealing to be in prison than living free in society.  I do not, however, believe that this is a 
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failing of the prison systems for not being harsh enough, but rather that the systems in place in 
society are not sufficient to satisfy the needs of its citizens.  That is, if it is ever the case that 
being incarcerated and unable to pursue your conception of the good is preferable to being a 
functioning member of society, it should be taken as a clear indication that the society is not 
structured correctly.  It may even be the case that there exist no well-structured societies today 
that are able to satisfy this claim, but I do not think this is a worry for the PHQ model of 
punishment so much as it is a worry for the structure of our societies.   
 It is also not the case that the steps to compensate individuals must be taken after the 
wrongdoer’s action, meaning an individual must commit some wrong in order to reap the 
rewards of the compensation, so to speak.  The PHQ model of punishment is required to both 
incarcerate and rehabilitate harmful individuals and to prevent crimes from happening wherever 
possible to promote public health (i.e., a safe, healthy, functioning society).  When the overall 
aim of the PHQ model is to maximize public health, doing so by providing preventative 
measures (e.g. education, health care, etc.) will always be the first and most important step in 
achieving that goal.  Making social programs available which work to prevent the circumstances 
from arising that result in individuals committing crimes before the crime has been committed is 
key in not only reducing crime, but also in preventing individuals from being incentivised to 
cause a crime.  Since the PHQ model would not be offering any significant improvement to 
one’s circumstances that were not already available prior to becoming a danger to society, there 
is no incentive for the individual to commit a crime merely to gain the advantage of whatever 
compensation is being provided.   
With that being said, the kind of punishment being suggested by the PHQ model (i.e., the 
smallest restriction of liberty possible while being able to ensure the safety of citizens) does not 
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guarantee that all people would find prison less desirable than freedom.  There is nothing, after 
all, about the rehabilitative process or the PHQ model in general that requires that a punishment 
should make the individual’s life worse off than it was previously, except that wrongdoers no 
longer have the liberty to pursue their own lives in the same way as they had before.  It must 
merely provide an environment in which the rehabilitation process is most likely to occur.  
Richard Wortley suggests that such an environment would consist of (Wortley 2005):  
(a) setting positive expectations through domestic furnishings that confer trust;  
(b) reducing anonymity through small prison size;  
(c) personalizing victims through humane conditions;  
(d) enabling a positive sense of community through ownership and personalization of the 
space;  
(e) reducing provocation and stress by designing in the capacity for inmates to enact 
control over environmental conditions and personal space. 
But while none of these recommendations require that the individual should be worse off than it 
was previously, but it also notably does not require that the individual be any better off either.  
Indeed, depending on the individual’s circumstances and personal preferences, such a prison 
environment might be much worse off than they were previously without also making the prison 
system more morally culpable for incarcerating the individual than it already was for restricting 
the individual’s liberty.  This is because the individual is not being harmed more than is 
absolutely necessary in order to ensure the safety of society.  On the other hand, it is doing 
everything possible to rehabilitate individuals as quickly and effectively as possible, thereby 
taking steps to fulfil its obligation of compensation to the individual. 
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As I have argued, there is no need to make prisons any more accommodating than this 
because there is no further moral obligation to compensate individuals than what is already being 
provided.  This provides some reason to believe that individuals would not prefer to be in prison 
because it would not be making the individuals life any better; ideally their lives would be nearly 
identical to before they were incarcerated, except that they no longer had the liberty engage with 
society directly.  One may still, however, argue that those who are worse off than the average 
person would still prefer whatever accommodation the prison could offer over their current lives.  
This may be true, but I think there are three things to say in response to this.  First, individuals 
are incentivized to actively participate in the rehabilitation process, such that they are more 
quickly able to pursue their own goals.  Second, it seems that we are actively making people 
better members of society, so even if the occasional person does something harmful just to get a 
stay at the so-called prison resort, then it seems to be a good thing overall anyway.  And third, 
there exist several compelling real-life examples in Norway and Denmark which seem to 
indicate that people would not choose this option, even if it were available. 
To the first reason, individuals should want to participate in becoming rehabilitated since 
it will enable them to continue their lives where they left off before being incarcerated; hopefully 
in a way that will be better for society overall.  This process, whatever it is, is meant to reduce a 
wrongdoer’s stay at the correct facility as much as possible, such that individuals cannot stay and 
leech37 off of society.  It is also meant to actually help the individual.  The focus, throughout the 
entire process, is to take the health and mental wellbeing of the individual as a serious concern. 
The second reason, I think, clearly shows the absurdity of demanding that we not make 
prison so inviting to wrongdoers.  The incapacitation of potentially dangerous individuals is 
                                                 
37 I strongly dislike this term since I think that it implies that people are lazy by nature, which I think is untrue, but I 
see the term used frequently enough that I used it only to explicitly say that it would not happen. 
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helping society and the individuals to become better members of society.  So, if an individual felt 
that they would be better off in prison and therefore causes some harm in order to be 
incarcerated, it is entirely possible that such an individual ought to have been in prison anyway.  
The majority of individuals will not want this, as is evidenced by several real-world examples.  
The Halden Prison in Norway is a real-life example of a prison that has been designed to 
specifically reduce crime.  It is a high security prison which closely resembles Smilansky’s 
concern for a prison of funishment.  Here, the normality principle has been implemented which 
aims to ensure that during a prison sentence life inside will resemble life outside as much as 
possible.38  The best part, however, is the empirical data that comes with implementing such a 
prison.  Here’s how Caruso has summarized the data (Caruso forthcoming, p. 31):39 
…when criminals in Norway leave prison, they tend to stay out. Norway’s 
recidivism rate of 20% is one of the lowest in the world. The recidivism rate of 
Bastoy Prison, for example, is about 16%. By contrast, in the U.S. more than 76% 
of prisoners are rearrested within five years. The recidivism rate in the U.K. is 
lower, about 45%, but still more than double that of Norway. These statistics 
reinforce what researchers are finally beginning to realize, that prison has at best a 
negligible—and at worst a damaging—impact on the likelihood a person will re-
offend (see Weatherburn 2010). 
 These things indicate that we don’t really have to worry about funishment being a 
damning objection to the PHQ model of punishment, even though we really do have a moral 
requirement to compensate individuals for their time at the prison.  While today’s prisons 
regularly produce repeat offenders, the kinds of prisons that would most closely resemble 
Smilansky’s funishment have been shown to have the greatest effects at reducing the recidivism 
rate.  I have argued that by taking the restorative and rehabilitative processes seriously, we are 
                                                 
38 For more details, see the Norwegian Correctional Service’s full document: 
http://www.kriminalomsorgen.no/information-in-english.265199.no.html 
39 See the Norway 2015 Crime and Safety Report. 
https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=16970 
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able to adequately meet this moral obligation, while also ensuring that we are doing everything 
in our power to actually help the wrongdoers who require it in order to remain or become 
functioning members of society. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I first exposited Caruso’s argument for a public health-quarantine model of 
punishment, given free will scepticism.  I showed that, starting from the right to protect ourselves 
from harm, we can justifiably incarcerate harmful or dangerous individuals in order to protect the 
safety of society.  This justification does not, however, preclude a moral obligation to 
compensate wrongdoers for treating them worse than we would otherwise, as Smilansky points 
out.  In order to meet this obligation, I have argued that we need only compensate for the bad 
brute luck which caused the individual to act wrongly (or to be a danger to society), and that by 
sufficiently negating this bad luck, the state’s moral obligation for compensation is fulfilled.  I 
have suggested that the only way in which one’s bad brute luck may be negated in this way, is to 
take seriously the individual’s health and autonomy, so that serious effort is focussed on helping 
that individual and ensuring that the help she receives is both wanted and needed in order to 
become a functioning member of society.  Both aspects of this help are required to ensure that 
the autonomy of the individual is respected while also being effective in rehabilitating and 
reducing recidivism.  Lastly, I have shown that compensation for bad brute luck need not result 
in funishment since the moral obligation does not necessitate living conditions well above the 
average and still requires a good deal of effort on the part of the wrongdoer to acquire the help 
that is needed.   
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By taking seriously my recommendation of ensuring the health of the wrongdoer, I have 
provided an interpretation of the PHQ model which avoids the “mere means” objection to 
punishment.  That is, it ensures that wrongdoers are not merely used as a means of promoting the 
general wellbeing of society, but are treated as autonomous individuals who deserve the respect 
that is required of all people.  Most importantly, it ensures that dangerous wrongdoers who are 
incarcerated for the safety of society are helped as quickly and efficiently as possible, similar to 
the way in which we are obligated to treat those with dangerously infectious diseases who are 
quarantined to ensure they cannot unintentionally harm others.  By ensuring wrongdoers are 
treated this way, the PHQ model of punishment cannot lose sight of the needs of the individual in 
favour of the greater good for society.  In that way, my argument that state-sanctioned 
punishment entails an obligation to the wrongdoers, actually strengthens the PHQ model from 
some common (and often damning) objections to the justification of punishment.  
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